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Contractual duress, unconstitutional conditions, and blackmail have long 
been puzzling. The puzzle is why these doctrines sometimes condemn threatening 
lawful action to induce agreements but sometimes do not. This Article provides a 
general solution to this puzzle. Such threats are (and should be) deemed unlawfully 
coercive only when they are contrived, meaning that the threatened action would 
not have occurred if no threat could have been made. I show that such contrived 
threats can be credible because making the threat strongly influences whether the 
threatened action occurs. When such threats are uncontrived warnings, meaning 
that the threatened action would have occurred even if no threat could have been 
made, they are not coercive and can only benefit the agreeing parties. However, 
sometimes (as with blackmail) agreements produced by uncontrived warnings are 
also unlawful on the ground that they harm third parties. The contrived-threat test 
explains why the Medicaid-defunding threat in the Affordable Care Act was 
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unconstitutional. It also explains why the recent King v Burwell conclusion—that 
the Affordable Care Act does not withhold tax credits from states that do not create 
insurance exchanges—would have been constitutionally required even if it had not 
been required by the statutory text. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 (ACA) with one nota-
ble exception: it struck down the provision that threatened to 
remove preexisting federal Medicaid funding from states that re-
fused to accept an expansion of Medicaid, on the ground that 
this threat “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from 
coercion.”2 This constitutional standard has been condemned as 
amorphous and meaningless.3 Because the standard explicitly 
incorporates contract-law concepts,4 we might hope to find clear 
guidance in the underlying contract law. But contract law makes 
the legality of threats that induce contractual agreements turn 
on whether the threats are “improper” or in “bad faith,” conclu-
sory labels that themselves have been deemed incoherent and 
meaningless.5 Nor could the Court find useful guidance from the 
general unconstitutional-conditions doctrine because it has been 
deemed conclusory, incoherent, and “infamously inadequate.”6 
 
 1 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 2 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 2603, 
2606 (2012) (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (“NFIB”); id at 2661–62 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
 3 See id at 2641 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by 
Sotomayor); Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, and Kevin Outterson, Plung-
ing into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independ-
ent Business v. Sebelius, 93 BU L Rev 1, 88 (2013). 
 4 See NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2602 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id 
at 2659–60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
 5 See Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex L Rev 717, 
752–53, 779 (2005) (finding that contract law has failed to “produc[e] a coherent jurispru-
dence of coercion”); Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: 
Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 Iowa L Rev 849, 862, 875–78 (1979). 
 6 Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 
1311, 1350 (2002). See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have given up even trying to 
define a coherent doctrine, openly admitting both in the Medicaid-
defunding-threat case and a subsequent unconstitutional-
conditions case that it could not articulate the line dividing con-
stitutional conditions from unconstitutional ones, although it 
was nonetheless—somehow—confident that the conditions it 
was considering were over the line.7 This Article solves these 
doctrinal puzzles with a coherent theory that is normatively at-
tractive and descriptively fits current legal results. 
For analytical clarity, it is important to exclude some cases 
that lie outside these puzzles. If a threatened action by a gov-
ernment or private party were independently unconstitutional 
or illegal, there would be no difficulty condemning the threat. 
Likewise, sometimes even an uncoerced agreement to a condi-
tion or contract would be independently illegal or unconstitu-
tional, usually because it would harm third parties or violate 
equal protection norms. In these cases, the independent doctrine 
of illegality or unconstitutionality does all the work. 
Other times, whether the agreement was coerced is irrele-
vant because the threatener has a power to compel without any 
agreement, such as when the government has a power to order 
the relevant action because the individual or state has no consti-
tutional right against such compulsion. Whenever direct coer-
cion is permissible, that fact moots the issue of when threats of 
otherwise-lawful action should be deemed coercive, because they 
would be permissible either way. But in these cases the work is 
done by the independent legal doctrines that create a power to 
coerce. 
The cases of interest involve situations in which a threat to 
engage in otherwise-lawful action (like a termination of funding) 
induces an agreement that is otherwise lawful, but the threat is 
nonetheless deemed too coercive to enforce the induced agree-
ment. Those threats are the ones for which we could use some 
coherent principle to explain why they are sometimes con-
demned and sometimes allowed. 
This Article provides a simple principle for resolving this 
puzzle. It begins, in Part I, by resolving the underlying confusion 
 
L Rev 1413, 1428 (1989) (finding that “the Court’s unconstitutional conditions rulings 
display serious inconsistencies in their account of coercion”). 
 7 See NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2606 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id 
at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting); Agency for International Devel-
opment v Alliance for Open Society International, Inc, 133 S Ct 2321, 2330 (2013). 
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in contract law about duress and contract modifications. I sub-
mit that this confusion can be resolved with the following simple 
principle: a threat to engage in otherwise-lawful action that in-
duces contract modification is unlawfully coercive only when the 
threat is contrived, meaning that the threatened action would 
not have occurred if no threat could have been made. 
The essence of the normative justification can easily be 
summarized. When a threat is not contrived, any legal prohibi-
tion that prevented the party from communicating the threat 
would, by definition, result in the threatened action. Moreover, 
because the threat, if made, would have induced the contract 
modification, both sides must, by definition, have thought that 
they were better off with the contract modification than with the 
threatened action. Deterring these threats would harm both 
parties. In such cases, communicating the planned action is less 
a threat than an uncontrived warning of what is coming, which 
gives the parties an opportunity to agree on an alternative that 
makes them both better off. 
In contrast, when the threat is contrived, preventing the 
threat would not result in the threatened action, and the parties 
would stick to the initial contract. Preventing such a contrived 
threat would clearly leave the threat recipient better off because 
he prefers the preexisting contract. Ex post, preventing the con-
trived threat would leave the threatener worse off because she 
prefers the modification that the threat could have induced. But 
if the modification raises total value for both parties, a threat is 
unnecessary to achieve that modification because it could be 
achieved with a bonus that shares the joint gain. If, in contrast, 
the modification would reduce total value, then the prospect of 
such welfare-reducing threats would (if they were allowed) be 
priced into the contract and reduce reliance on the contract in a 
way that would harm both parties. Moreover, sometimes a con-
trived threat will not succeed in inducing contract modification 
and will then be carried out, which will leave both parties worse 
off than if the preexisting contract had continued. An ability to 
make such threats might also result in the other side making 
welfare-reducing threats of its own. Thus, ex ante, both parties 
would be better off preventing contrived threats. 
The distinction between contrived threats and uncontrived 
warnings turns only on whether, in a no-threat world, the 
threatened action would have occurred. It does not turn on the 
wording of the communication. Nor does it require inquiry into 
  
508  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:503 
   
the threatener’s purpose. The threatener may have the benign 
purpose of making the threat recipient better off, but the issue 
here presumes that the threat recipient begins with a legal au-
tonomy right to make his own choices free of coercion by others, 
however well-intentioned that coercion may be. A threatening 
government may not even have a collective purpose, but such a 
purpose is unnecessary because what matters is what the gov-
ernment would have actually done without the threat. To be 
sure, the lack of any reason to take the threatened action in a 
no-threat world provides powerful evidence that the threatened 
action would not have occurred in that world. In that sense, 
purpose may sometimes be relevant to determining what would 
have happened, but the ultimate test is solely what would have 
happened without the threat, which need not require inquiry in-
to purpose. 
The contrived nature of a threat should also be distin-
guished from the threat’s credibility. A threat is credible if, post-
threat, the threatener would carry out the threatened action if 
the threat recipient did not agree. A threat is uncontrived if, in a 
no-threat world, the threatener would have taken that action 
anyway. The two differ because making a threat can strongly in-
fluence whether the threatened action occurs. As detailed below, 
a contrived threat to engage in unprofitable action can be credi-
ble when done in stages, as in the usual contracts case in which 
performance is withheld day by day, because the victim’s refusal 
to modify at each stage is itself not credible, so that the threat is 
expected to result in profitable modification. Making a contrived 
threat can also change the emotional calculus or create reputa-
tional effects that make persons carry out the threat, even 
though they would not have taken the action in a no-threat 
world. Indeed, a credibility test has circularity problems when 
such reputational effects exist, because whether a threat is cred-
ible can depend on whether the induced agreement is enforceable. 
Persons or governments may also take steps to make their con-
trived threats more credible, such as incurring commitments, 
debts, or costs that make carrying out the threatened action 
more likely. When those steps would not have been taken absent 
an ability to communicate the threat, the credible threat re-
mains contrived. 
A contrived threat is thus not the same as a bluff, because 
contrived threats are often credible. Nor are contrived threats 
harmless when they are bluffs. Bluffs can be very effective in 
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coercing agreements when the victim is mistaken or even just 
unsure about the credibility of the threat. Indeed, if the bluff in-
duced the victim to accept an adverse modification, it must have 
appeared credible enough to the victim. Nor is harm avoided 
when the victim rejects a modification. If a victim does so be-
cause he wrongly perceived that the threat was not credible, the 
threat will be carried out, harming both parties. If a victim does 
so because he correctly perceived that the threat was not credi-
ble, the threat will not be carried out but will still have created 
unnecessary conflict and negotiation costs. It is thus always bet-
ter to deter a contrived threat from being made (by eliminating 
any possible gain from it), regardless of how credible the threat 
might have been or seemed. 
My distinction between contrived threats and uncontrived 
warnings is related to, but different from, distinctions between 
threats and warnings that have been drawn by Professor Robert 
Nozick, Professor Thomas Schelling, and others.8 Whereas my 
definition turns on a pure but-for prediction, Nozick and other 
philosophers define threats in a way that combines moral and 
prediction baselines, which, as I show below, not only muddles 
the results but also perversely leads to more immoral conduct. 
Schelling and others use a prediction baseline—but one that is 
based on a pre-threat baseline rather than my no-threat base-
line—and Schelling draws no normative conclusions about 
threats but rather focuses on analyzing their credibility. 
Legally, an important benefit of using a contrived-threat 
test is not only that it is normatively desirable but also that, as 
Part I shows, the contrived-threat test descriptively explains 
many features and conclusions of contract law, whereas scholars 
who advocate a credibility test acknowledge that their test bears 
no relationship to existing contract law. Under contract law, a 
modification without mutual consideration is unenforceable if 
induced by a contrived threat, and a modification with mutual 
consideration is unenforceable if induced by a contrived threat to 
take action that would leave the victim significantly worse off. 
I then show, in Part II, that the contrived-threat test also 
explains the Medicaid-defunding-threat case and provides a 
general, desirable solution to the problem of unconstitutional 
conditions. When a threat is contrived, the government benefit 
would have been provided in the but-for world without that 
 
 8 See Part I.F.1.  
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condition, and thus the threat to withhold the benefit penalizes 
the exercise of a constitutional right. When the threat is uncon-
trived, the government benefit would not have been provided in 
that but-for world, and thus withholding the benefit imposes no 
penalty. Some constitutional law scholarship going back to Pro-
fessor Seth Kreimer has, following Nozick, included a similar 
prediction baseline but (like Nozick) combined it with other 
baselines in a way that I show both confuses and worsens the 
results.9 My contrived-threat test also shows that even if it had 
been textually plausible to interpret the ACA to deny federal tax 
credits to states that declined to create health insurance ex-
changes, such an interpretation should have been rejected be-
cause that would be a contrived threat and thus unconstitutional. 
Finally, Part III shows that the contrived-threat test also 
explains and justifies current legal treatment of threats that in-
duce private parties to enter into new contracts. It also solves 
the blackmail puzzle, showing that all blackmail contracts are 
necessarily produced by either (1) contrived threats, which cre-
ate inefficiencies for the contracting parties without affecting in-
formation disclosure, or (2) uncontrived warnings, which sup-
press the disclosure of information to third parties whose 
interests often trump the interests of the contracting parties. 
The combination is what explains and justifies the full scope of 
blackmail law. 
I.  THREATS THAT INDUCE CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS 
Whether a contract modification is enforceable turns on 
whether the threat that induced it is improper or in bad faith. 
Part I.A shows that, although those standards appear quite con-
clusory, the guidance about how to apply them is consistent with 
deeming threats improper or in bad faith only when they are 
contrived. Part I.B shows that a contrived-threat test also ex-
plains the pattern of case results in a normatively attractive 
way. Part I.C provides a more general proof about the normative 
desirability of a contrived-threat test. Part I.D shows that other 
legal elements for making contract modifications unenforceable 
can also be explained under a contrived-threat approach. Final-
ly, Part I.E explains why a contrived-threat test is preferable to 
the credible-threat test that is proposed by some leading scholars, 
 
 9 See notes 223–29.  
  
2016] Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings 511 
 
and Part I.F explains why a contrived-threat test is also prefer-
able to various other tests suggested by scholars. 
A. Why Contract Standards Suggest a Contrived-Threat Test 
For threats of otherwise-lawful action that induce contract 
modifications, contract law has both a special rule and a more 
general rule. The special rule applies only to modifications with-
out mutual consideration, which increase the obligations of one 
party without providing any fresh consideration for that change. 
The more general duress rule applies to any threat that induces 
contractual agreement. Although the general legal standards for 
both are conclusory, the official guidance on them suggests a 
contrived-threat test. 
1. The special rule for modifications without mutual 
consideration. 
A threat to breach a contract that induces a modification 
without mutual consideration is not binding unless the modifica-
tion is (for a goods contract) in “good faith”10 or (for a nongoods 
contract) “fair and equitable in view of circumstances not antici-
pated by the parties when the contract was made.”11 Although 
terms like “good faith” and “fair and equitable” are conclusory, 
the law does provide guidance on the meaning of these terms. 
For nongoods contracts, this guidance provides: “The limita-
tion to a modification which is ‘fair and equitable’ . . . requires 
an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification.”12 
An objectively demonstrable reason provides an independent 
reason to breach if no modification were possible, thus suggest-
ing an uncontrived warning. The lack of any such reason would 
instead suggest a likely contrived threat. 
The unanticipated-circumstances element is often confused 
with unforeseen circumstances, but that is not the correct test; 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes clear that the rel-
evant unanticipated circumstances could be established by such 
foreseeable events as a person being offered a higher price or in-
curring a 17 percent cost increase.13 This is consistent with a 
contrived-threat test because such changes, though foreseeable, 
 
 10 UCC § 2-209, comment 2 (ALI 2014).  
 11 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89(a) (1981). 
 12 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b (1981). 
 13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b, illustrations 3–4 (1981).  
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can often be the basis for an uncontrived warning if they make 
breach profitable despite contract remedies. The Restatement 
indicates that what it means by an unanticipated circumstance 
is one that “was not adequately covered” by the contract, “even 
though it was foreseen as a remote possibility.”14 
“Unanticipated” thus means not specifically addressed by 
the contract. This factor is quite relevant to judging whether a 
threat is contrived, because if any changed circumstances were 
already specifically addressed in the contract, then it seems un-
likely that the change would have provoked a breach in a world 
where no modification were possible. For example, suppose that 
costs have increased by 17 percent, but the contract specifically 
provides that if costs increase above 10 percent, the contract 
price will increase by the cost increase plus a specified markup. 
In that case, the parties have already determined what suffices 
to induce performance under those circumstances, so a claim 
that those circumstances would inevitably provoke breach seems 
contrived. Threatening to breach because of a circumstance spe-
cifically anticipated by the contract thus seems likely to be a 
contrived threat. 
For goods contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code com-
ments flesh out the “good faith” test by stating: 
[T]he extortion of a “modification” without legitimate com-
mercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good 
faith. . . . The test of “good faith” . . . may in some situations 
require an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a 
modification. But such matters as a market shift which 
makes performance come to involve a loss may provide such 
a reason even though there is no such unforeseen difficulty as 
would make out a legal excuse from performance.15 
The reference to an “objectively demonstrable reason” again 
suggests an uncontrived warning, and the last sentence confirms 
that such a reason can exist even because of foreseen changes in 
circumstances. 
2. The general duress rule. 
The general duress rule provides that any contract (includ-
ing a new contract or modification with mutual consideration) is 
 
 14 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b (1981). 
 15 UCC § 2-209, comment 2 (ALI 2014). 
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voidable when induced by (1) “an improper threat” that 
(2) “leaves the victim no reasonable alternative” but to agree.16 
At one time, the no-reasonable-alternative element referred 
to conclusory, and somewhat mystical, notions of whether the 
victim’s “free will” was overborne.17 However, contract law has 
long rejected such notions and concluded that this element simp-
ly requires evidence that carrying out the threat would have 
made the victim significantly worse off.18 
The key normative work is thus done by the improperness 
element, which standing alone is conclusory. But Restatement 
§ 176 provides an extended definition of when a threat is im-
proper. Some of the definition simply refers to threatened ac-
tions that are independently unlawful, which does not help with 
the current issue.19 But other parts of the definition say that a 
threat is improper if it is in bad faith, and the accompanying 
comments indicate that is so when the threat lacks an “objec-
tively demonstrable reason,” which, as the above shows, sug-
gests a contrived threat.20 Even more helpfully, the Restatement 
provides, “A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not 
on fair terms, and . . . the threatened act would harm the recipi-
ent and would not significantly benefit the party making the 
threat.”21 If a threatened act would not significantly benefit the 
threatener, the party likely would not have taken the action if 
unable to make the threat, thus indicating a contrived threat. 
B. How a Contrived-Threat Test Explains the Case Law 
1. Cases of modifications without mutual consideration. 
Consider first the renowned case of Alaska Packers’ Associa-
tion v Domenico.22 A group of fishermen agreed in San Francisco 
to take a boat to Alaska and fish in exchange for a company paying 
 
 16 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (1981). 
 17 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175, comment b (1981). 
 18 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175, comment b (1981) (rejecting the 
test that “the threat must arouse such fear as precludes a party from exercising free will 
and judgment or that it must be such as would induce assent on the part of a brave man 
or a man of ordinary firmness . . . because of [the test’s] vagueness and impracticability,” 
and providing a series of examples making clear that no reasonable alternative exists 
whenever the alternative would make the victim significantly worse off). 
 19 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(1)(a)–(c) (1981). 
 20 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(1)(d) & comment e (1981). 
 21 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2) (1981). 
 22 117 F 99 (9th Cir 1902). 
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each fisherman $50 for the season plus 2 cents for each salmon 
he caught.23 Once the fishermen were in Alaska, they threatened 
to stop work entirely and return to San Francisco unless their 
fixed pay was increased to $100.24 Although the fishermen 
claimed that they threatened this because their nets were defec-
tive, the district court found otherwise, and the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the threat to stop work was “without any valid 
cause” and timed to take advantage of the fact that the company 
could not get replacement fishermen to such a remote location in 
time for the short fishing season.25 The company, which had also 
invested $150,000 in a salmon cannery in Alaska, agreed to in-
crease the fixed pay to $100.26 The court held that, under these 
circumstances, this modification was unenforceable.27 
Given these findings,28 the fishermen’s threat was clearly 
contrived. The fishermen had no valid reason for threatening to 
stop work, and doing so would not only deprive them of any 
wages for the season but also require them to fund their travel 
back to San Francisco and subject themselves to a risk of dam-
ages. There was thus no good reason to think that, if unable to 
make this threat, the fishermen would have stopped working. If 
contract law deters such threats from being made (by eliminat-
ing any gains from the modifications they induce), then the fish-
ermen would have performed under the existing contract. 
The lower court had upheld the modification because it con-
cluded that it was mutually beneficial based on the company’s 
consent, which indicated that the company must have decided 
the modification was better than suing for breach of contract—
 
 23 Id at 100.  
 24 Id at 100–01. 
 25 Id at 101–02 (stressing that the fishermen “willfully and arbitrarily broke” their 
contractual obligation and noting the parallel to another case in which the threat to 
breach was “unjustifiable”). 
 26 Alaska Packers’, 117 F at 100–01. 
 27 Id at 102–03. Although some read this case to adopt a flat rule that modifications 
without mutual consideration are never enforceable, the court stressed that its holding 
that mutual consideration was absent applied only “under such circumstances” and also 
depended on the conclusion that any mutual waiver of the original contract was not “vol-
untary,” because the circumstances were like another case in which the threatener took 
“an unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other party” by threatening nonper-
formance and thus “coerce[d]” the other party to increase the consideration it provided. 
Id at 102, quoting King v Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co, 63 NW 1105, 1106 (Minn 1895). 
 28 Some have argued that the true facts were otherwise. See, for example, Bar-Gill 
and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 757 (cited in note 5). But what matters for assessing the 
legal standard is the conclusion that the found facts made the modification unenforceable. 
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probably because the fishermen could not pay damages.29 The 
problem with the lower court’s logic is that it wrongly assumes 
that, absent any communicated threat, the fishermen would 
have walked off the job. Instead, the findings indicate that they 
would not have done so, and that their threat to do so was thus 
contrived to extort the modification. A contract doctrine that de-
ters such contrived threats from ever being communicated will 
thus result in performance of the original contract. A contract 
doctrine that instead made modifications produced by contrived 
threats enforceable would encourage such contrived threats, 
which would clearly make the company worse off because it pre-
fers original contract performance to the modification. 
Moreover, a contract doctrine that made modifications pro-
duced by contrived threats enforceable would also be bad for 
fishermen ex ante. Switching to such a doctrine would encourage 
contrived threats and modifications that would make the fish-
ermen’s original promise to perform less valuable to the fish 
company, and thus would make the fish company unwilling to 
pay as much or to enter into the contract at all. To make itself 
less vulnerable to such contrived threats, the company might al-
so be less willing to make investments in reliance on the con-
tract (like $150,000 for a cannery or spending to charter a boat), 
which is ex ante bad for the fishermen because reducing those 
investments reduces the productive value of their labor and thus 
reduces what they can get paid. 
In contrast, suppose that the facts had been different. Sup-
pose that the fishermen threatened to stop work unless their 
pay were increased to $100 because, once they got to Alaska, an-
other firm offered to pay them $90. This would not be a con-
trived threat because, if unable to make this threat, the fisher-
men would (given their assumed inability to pay contract 
damages) walk off the job for better pay, which would clearly 
leave the fish company worse off than with the modification. It 
would instead be an uncontrived warning of what would inevi-
tably happen if no modification were possible. Deterring the mod-
ification induced by this uncontrived warning would be harmful 
to both sides—without it, the fishermen would get $90 instead of 
$100, and the fish company would be without fishermen. 
But doesn’t this uncontrived warning still diminish the will-
ingness of the fish company to pay as much in the original contract 
 
 29 Alaska Packers’, 117 F at 102. 
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or to make investments that rely on it? Actually, no. The uncon-
trived warning allows a modification that makes the fish com-
pany better off than it would be if the fishermen walked off the 
job, which is what would happen if no warning were given. Thus, 
the possibility that uncontrived warnings would produce such 
modifications actually increases the value of the contract and 
encourages greater investment in relying on it. To be sure, the 
prospect that the fishermen might independently want to walk 
off the job (in a way that a contract damages action would not 
fully compensate) does diminish the value of the contract and re-
liance on it. But if the warning is uncontrived, that prospect will 
arise regardless; the ability to modify the contract when it arises 
thus can only reduce the losses from that prospect. 
Consistent with this conclusion, the Restatement indicates 
that a modification increasing an employee’s pay for already-
contracted performance would be binding if it came after an em-
ployee told his employer that he was abandoning the contract 
because another firm had offered him more money.30 The Alaska 
Packers’ court’s own reasoning likewise suggests that its result 
would have been different if the threat to breach the contract 
were made for a “valid cause,” which switching to a higher-
paying firm would presumably supply.31 Indeed, Alaska Packers’ 
indicated no doubts about the enforceability of a prior modifica-
tion without mutual consideration that increased the fixed pay 
of many of the fishermen from $50 to $60 before they left San 
Francisco.32 The fishermen would not have been able to induce 
that change if the fish company could secure substitute fisher-
men for less than $60, which suggests that the market rate had 
risen to $60 for these fishermen and that they would thus have 
declined to get on the boat for Alaska if that modification were 
not possible. 
Likewise, if a party’s contract-performance costs have in-
creased above expected costs by an amount sufficient to make 
performance unprofitable, then modifications that pay it more 
 
 30 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, illustration 3 (1981). See also Schwartzreich 
v Bauman-Basch, Inc, 131 NE 887, 890 (NY 1921). Although a threat to leave for higher 
pay could be contrived if the pay increase were lower than the expected contract damag-
es, the employee in Schwartzreich had simply announced he was leaving for higher pay 
without demanding any modification, thus indicating that he would have left if no modi-
fication were possible. Id at 888. 
 31 Alaska Packers’, 117 F at 102. 
 32 Id at 100. 
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for the same performance have generally been deemed binding.33 
In such cases, threats not to perform are usually uncontrived 
warnings because the party would likely walk away from the 
unprofitable contract if unable to communicate any threat to do 
so. This is not always so, because paying contract damages 
might be even more unprofitable than performance. But the cas-
es finding the modifications enforceable generally indicate that 
the threatener was unwilling to perform at the contract price 
(perhaps because the threatener rationally found the performance 
cost worse than the risk of paying contract damages),34 which 
would make the threat uncontrived. 
If contract remedies left victims of breach just as well off as 
they would be with contract performance (as expectation dam-
ages aspire to do), then threats to breach contracts could never 
get threatened parties to agree to modifications that left them 
worse off than with contract performance; they would instead re-
ject the modifications and take the contract remedies.35 Under-
compensatory contract remedies are thus necessary for a threat 
to breach to lead to harmful modifications. But modifications 
without fresh consideration by definition leave threatened par-
ties worse off than they would be with contract performance. Ac-
cordingly, such nonmutual modifications indicate that contract 
remedies must undercompensate threatened parties in some 
way. This could be true for various reasons, including that ex-
pectation damages cannot be collected or that actual contract 
remedies often provide less than full expectation damages. But 
direct proof that contract remedies are undercompensatory is 
unnecessary because one can infer undercompensatory remedies 
from the nonmutual modification itself. So it is not surprising 
that courts require no proof of undercompensatory remedies in 
cases in which threats to breach induced nonmutual modifica-
tions. However, while undercompensatory contract remedies are 
necessary for a threat to breach to lead to harmful modifications, 
they are not sufficient: the threat to breach must also be con-
trived. Indeed, undercompensatory contract remedies are often 
what lead to uncontrived warnings that a breach is coming. When 
 
 33 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, illustrations 1–2, 4 (1981). 
 34 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, illustration 1 (1981); 
Brian Construction and Development Co v Brighenti, 405 A2d 72, 74 (Conn 1978); Siebring 
Manufacturing Co v Carlson Hybrid Corn Co, 70 NW2d 149, 151 (Iowa 1955); Goebel v 
Linn, 11 NW 284, 284–85 (Mich 1882). 
 35 See Part I.D.1.  
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that is the case, communicating the uncontrived warning can lead 
to modifications that make both parties better off than the breach 
that would occur if no warning could be communicated. 
2. Cases of modifications with mutual consideration. 
Consider now the famous case of Wolf v Marlton Corp.36 Af-
ter contracting to buy a house in a housing development, the 
buyers decided to divorce and wanted to escape the contract.37 
They threatened that, unless the seller agreed to cancel the con-
tract and return their security deposit, they would go ahead 
with the purchase and deliberately resell the house to an unde-
sirable purchaser, which would reduce property values in the 
neighboring tracts owned by the seller.38 The court held that this 
threat of economic harm overcame the free will of the seller but 
could constitute duress only if the threat were also “wrongful.”39 
The court acknowledged that the threatened action was perfect-
ly lawful because the buyers had the legal right to resell to 
whomever they wished, regardless of the economic effect on the 
seller.40 However, the court concluded that it was nonetheless 
wrongful when “a party for purely malicious and unconscionable 
motives threatens to resell such a home to a purchaser, specially 
selected because he would be undesirable, for the sole purpose of 
injuring the builder’s business.”41 The Restatement likewise 
makes clear that a threat to resell property to a purchaser that 
will have adverse effects on surrounding land is improper only if 
the threat is made “solely” to induce the contract modification.42 
The court’s conclusion fits well with the theory that threats 
are wrongful when they are contrived. If the threat to resell to a 
purchaser specially selected to be undesirable was “purely mali-
cious” and with the “sole purpose” of harming the seller’s busi-
ness and inducing a modification,43 then there was no good rea-
son to think that (if unable to communicate the threat) the 
buyers would have limited their resale options to undesirable 
purchasers. Limiting the set of potential purchasers would 
 
 36 154 A2d 625 (NJ Super App Div 1959). 
 37 Id at 626–27. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id at 629, quoting Rubenstein v Rubenstein, 120 A2d 11, 15 (NJ 1956). 
 40 Wolf, 154 A2d at 630. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment e, illustration 10 (1981). 
 43 Wolf, 154 A2d at 630.  
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naturally tend to lower the expected resale price, which would 
harm the threatening buyers. Deterring the threat would thus 
result in the original buyers making no special effort to seek out 
undesirable purchasers. The threat was therefore contrived and, 
accordingly, wrongful. 
The Wolf court’s reasoning indicates that its holding would 
have been different if the threat had not made for the sole pur-
pose of harming the seller but was instead warning about com-
ing action that would be independently beneficial for the threat-
ening buyers. Suppose, for example, that the buyers had told the 
seller they planned to resell to a registered child molester be-
cause he was willing to pay 10 percent over market price. In 
that case, the communication would be an uncontrived warning 
because, if unable to make this communication in order to nego-
tiate a modification, the buyers would in fact resell to the child 
molester, who was willing to pay the most. The seller would pre-
fer to receive this warning because it enables the seller to nego-
tiate a modification that makes the seller better off than he 
would be without the warning. 
The Wolf decision shows that threats can be contrived, and 
thus improper, even if there is some probability that the threat-
ened action would have occurred in a no-threat world. After all, 
even if the home buyers made no special effort to resell the 
house to an undesirable purchaser, there are presumably some 
odds (call it X percent) that this would happen just from resell-
ing to the highest bidder. Nonetheless, the threat to resell only 
to an undesirable purchaser means the home buyers are threat-
ening to increase those odds to 100 percent, which is still a con-
trived threat because the threatened action would not have oc-
curred 100 – X percent of the time in a no-threat world. 
Accordingly, a threat stated with certainty (as most threats are) 
is contrived when the threatened action is actually a probabilistic 
event.44 More generally, a threat that overstates the likelihood of 
the threatened action is contrived. 
In contrast, accurately stating the odds that the threatened 
action would occur in the no-threat world would be an uncon-
trived warning. Suppose, for example, that the home buyers 
were trying to resell their house and the bidding came down to 
two bidders, one of whom was a registered child molester, and 
 
 44 Most threatened actions involve acts over which the threatener has control, so 
most threatened actions are not probabilistic in this sense. 
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that if no threat were communicated, the odds would be fifty–
fifty which bidder would win. If the home buyers were to accu-
rately communicate those odds to the seller, then that would be 
an uncontrived warning because the communication would not 
overstate the odds that the threatened action would have oc-
curred anyway. If the seller preferred the modification to those 
fifty–fifty odds, then the seller would be better off knowing 
about those odds and agreeing to the modification. If the com-
munication were deterred, then the seller would be worse off 
because he would suffer fifty–fifty odds that he would deem 
worse than the modification. 
The Wolf case also shows that threats that induce contract 
modifications can be contrived, and thus improper, even though 
no threat to breach the contract was made. In Wolf, the threat 
was actually to perform the contract, but then to act in a partic-
ular manner afterward that was contrived. 
Other cases involve threats to breach a contract that lead to 
modifications with mutual consideration. A leading case is Austin 
Instrument, Inc v Loral Corp.45 Austin had a contract to supply 
gear parts to Loral to make radar sets for the Navy.46 When Loral 
got a second Navy contract for radar sets, Loral told Austin it 
would get a second contract only on those gear parts for which it 
was the lowest bidder.47 Austin immediately said that it was op-
posed to supplying less than all gear parts on the second con-
tract, and the next day Austin threatened to cease deliveries 
under the first contract unless Loral not only ordered all gear 
parts from Austin on the second contract but also gave Austin 
substantial price increases on gear parts under the first con-
tract, whether or not those gear parts were already delivered.48 
Although the court focused on whether Loral had any reasonable 
alternative, because that was the issue disputed on appeal, the 
court made clear that duress also required a showing that the 
threat was “wrongful.”49 
Here the threat was properly deemed wrongful because the 
threat to cease delivery was contrived.50 True, the lower court 
 
 45 272 NE2d 533 (NY 1971). 
 46 Id at 534. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Austin, 272 NE2d at 535. 
 50 Dicta in the opinion suggest that any threat to breach a contract is wrongful. Id. 
The actual holding, however, is limited to the court’s factual findings, and the Restate-
ment makes it crystal clear that “[a] threat by a party to a contract not to perform his 
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noted that Austin claimed it was motivated by cost increases 
that made supplying gear parts unprofitable,51 but the high 
court’s statement of facts omitted this claim in a way that im-
plicitly rejected it. Further, such a cost-based motive seemed 
implausible given the facts that (1) the timing indicated that the 
threat was motivated by a desire to supply all gear parts on the 
second contract, rather than by cost increases; (2) cost increases 
that make supplying gear parts unprofitable are not a likely mo-
tive for insisting on supplying more gear parts; and (3) a need to 
cover costs on future supplies cannot explain the demand for 
price increases on already-delivered gear parts. Thus, the facts 
suggested that Austin would not have naturally ceased delivery 
under the first contract, and that it threatened to do so only be-
cause making that threat would induce the desired contract 
modification.  
When cost increases do make contract performance highly 
unprofitable, the Restatement concludes that it is permissible to 
threaten to breach unless the price is increased.52 This conclu-
sion is consistent with a contrived-threat test because such facts 
suggest that the party would not perform even if there were no 
prospect of inducing a modification, which would make the 
threat an uncontrived warning. 
When a threat to breach induces a nonmutual modification, 
we can (as noted above) infer that contract remedies must be 
undercompensatory, because otherwise the threatened party 
would not have agreed to the modification. In contrast, we can-
not make the same inference for modifications with mutual con-
sideration, because it is possible that the return consideration 
made the threatened party better off at the time of the modifica-
tion. When threats to breach induce mutual modifications, 
courts like the one in Austin often do require evidence that the 
contract remedy is significantly undercompensatory.53 
 
contractual duty is not, of itself, improper.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, 
comment e (1981).  
 51 Austin Instrument, Inc v Loral Corp, 316 NYS2d 528, 530 (NY App 1970). The 
lower court did not confirm whether Austin’s costs had actually risen enough to make 
performance unprofitable, but rather it simply noted that cost increases and renegotia-
tions were common at the time. Id. 
 52 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, illustration 8 (1981). 
 53 See Austin, 272 NE2d at 535. 
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C. A General Proof for the Contrived-Threat Test 
Assume a threat is made to induce a contract modification. 
Call the value of the initial contract Ct for the threatener and Cr 
for the recipient of the threat. Call the value of the modified con-
tract Mt for the threatener and Mr for the recipient. And call the 
value of the situation if the threatened action were taken Tt for 
the threatener and Tr for recipient. 
We know that Mr > Tr, because otherwise the threat would 
not induce modification. For modifications without mutual con-
sideration, by definition Cr > Mr because the modification worsens 
the deal for the recipient with zero offsetting benefits. Therefore, 
Cr > Mr > Tr. For modifications with mutual consideration, it 
may not be clear that Cr > Mr at the time of modification.54 But 
the no-reasonable-alternative element of duress means that the 
threatened action would leave the victim significantly worse off 
than under the contract and thus means that Cr > Tr.55 Such a 
threat would be necessary to induce modification only if the recip-
ient preferred the contract to the modification, because if 
Mr > Cr, the recipient would accept the offered modification 
without any threat. So we can infer from such a threat that 
Cr > Mr. Alternatively, direct proof might exist that Cr > Mr. Ei-
ther way, contract-doctrine elements that are separate from the 
“improperness” or “bad faith” of the threat establish that 
Cr > Mr > Tr. 
The threatener would not have sought the modification un-
less the threatener preferred the modification both to the con-
tract (so Mt > Ct) and to the threatened action (so Mt > Tt). 
However, further ranking has two possibilities that differ de-
pending on whether the threatener prefers the contract to tak-
ing the threatened action. One possibility is that Mt > Tt > Ct. 
In this case, the threat is uncontrived because taking the 
threatened action would make the threatener better off than she 
would be under the contract. The other possibility is that 
Mt > Ct > Tt. In this case, the threat is contrived because taking 
the threatened action would make the threatener worse off than 
she would be under the contract. 
 
 54 When a threat recipient opposes modification enforcement, we know that 
Cr > Mr at the time of litigation, but that valuation could reflect changes in costs or 
market prices since the time of modification. 
 55 See Part I.D.1.  
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1. Uncontrived warnings. 
If Mt > Tt > Ct and the law prevents the threat and thus the 
modification, then the threatened action will occur because it 
makes the threatener better off than sticking to the contract. 
Preventing the threat and modification would thus make both 
parties worse off because they would both prefer the modifica-
tion to the situation with the threatened action (that is, Mr > Tr 
and Mt > Tt). The threat is thus an uncontrived warning of what 
is inevitably coming unless the parties agree to a mutually bene-
ficial alternative. 
True, such an uncontrived threat will induce a modification 
that is less valuable to the recipient than the contract. Thus, 
relative to contract performance, the prospect of modifications 
might seem to reduce the contract’s initial value to the recipient. 
But contract performance is the wrong baseline because, without 
the uncontrived threat and modification, the victim would in-
stead suffer the threatened action, the prospect of which would 
reduce the contract’s initial value to the recipient even more. Ac-
cordingly, relative to the correct but-for baseline of the threat-
ened action occurring, the prospect of allowing modifications 
when uncontrived warnings are made will raise the contract’s 
initial value to the threat recipient, making the recipient willing 
to give contract terms that are more favorable to the threatener 
and to make more relationship-specific investments, both of 
which will also raise the contract’s initial value to the threaten-
er. Both parties are thus better off if such uncontrived warnings 
are allowed to induce contract modifications. 
2. Contrived threats. 
If Mt > Ct > Tt and the law prevents the threat and the 
modification, then the threatened action would not occur, be-
cause taking the threatened action would leave the threatener 
worse off than under the contract. The original contract will 
thus be performed. Preventing such a contrived threat would 
thus clearly leave the recipient better off because Cr > Mr. That 
may suffice if the normative goal of duress/modification doctrine 
is simply to protect the recipient. 
Further, ex ante, preventing contrived threats will also be 
preferable to the threatener, and thus both parties would benefit 
from a contract doctrine that prevented contrived threats. True, 
ex post, preventing such a contrived threat would leave the 
threatener worse off because Mt > Ct. But ex ante, the prospect 
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of contrived threats will be priced into the contract and affect 
the extent of reliance on that contract. To evaluate those effects, 
consider the following three possible consequences of a contrived 
threat. 
a) Contrived threats that induce modifications that reduce 
joint welfare.  One variation is that a contrived threat might in-
duce a modification that lowers the total combined value for the 
parties, which means that Cr + Ct > Mr + Mt. In that case, not 
only would the modification lower joint welfare, but also the pro-
spect of such modifications would lower the contract’s initial 
value to the recipient, leading the recipient to demand better 
terms and make fewer relationship-specific investments, both of 
which lower the contract’s initial value to both the threatener 
and the threat recipient. Further, the potential threatener 
would know that the recipient could make his own threats of 
this nature, which would leave both the threatener and the re-
cipient worse off. In short, such welfare-reducing threats will be 
priced into the contract, deter reliance on the contract in a way 
that harms both parties, and be used against both sides, so that 
ex ante both parties would be better off preventing such threats. 
b) Contrived threats that induce modifications that in-
crease joint welfare.  The other variation is that the modification 
increases total joint value because the modification’s benefit to 
the threatener exceeds its harm to the recipient. In that case, 
Mt – Ct > Cr – Mr. But then the threatener does not need to 
make a threat to induce the modification. The threatener could 
instead obtain the same modification by offering a bonus B 
that exceeds the recipient’s harm (Cr – Mr) but is lower than 
the threatener’s benefit from the modification (Mt – Ct), so 
that Mt – Ct > B > Cr – Mr. In short, if the modification increas-
es joint welfare, it can be achieved without making any threat 
(of Tr < Mr < Cr) by instead offering a bonus that shares the 
joint gains between the two parties so that Mr + B > Cr. Thus, 
preventing contrived threats is never necessary for threats that 
enhance joint welfare. 
c) Contrived threats that induce no modification.  The fi-
nal possibility is that a contrived threat fails to induce a modifi-
cation, perhaps because the recipient did not perceive it to be 
credible. If the recipient is mistaken in his perception, then the 
threat will be carried out, which makes both sides worse off be-
cause Cr > Tr and Ct > Tt. If the recipient is correct in his 
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perception, then the contract will continue, but the parties will 
have incurred unnecessary costs of conflict and negotiation. 
d) Overall effect of banning all contrived threats.  In 
short, preventing all contrived threats will prevent some modifi-
cations that reduce joint welfare, will never prevent modifications 
that increase joint welfare, and will prevent some contrived 
threats from being carried out to the detriment of both parties. 
Thus, banning all contrived threats leaves both parties better off 
ex ante, without any need to examine the welfare effects of the 
modification. 
One might wonder whether we should also prevent uncon-
trived warnings because they, too, can never be necessary for 
modifications that enhance joint welfare relative to contract per-
formance. The reason we should not is that, although uncontrived 
warnings can indeed produce modifications that lower joint wel-
fare relative to contract performance, without the uncontrived 
warnings we would not get contract performance. Instead, we 
would get the threatened action, and the induced modification 
does enhance welfare for both parties relative to the situation 
with that threatened action. 
In short, to assess the effects of a threat/warning, we must 
compare those effects to a but-for baseline that reflects the ef-
fects that would exist in the world but for the making of that 
threat/warning. For a contrived threat, the effects are negative 
because the but-for baseline is contract performance, which 
gives higher joint value than any modification that requires 
such a threat. For an uncontrived warning, the effects are posi-
tive because the but-for baseline is a threatened act that gives 
both parties lower value than the modification does. 
D. Other Legal Elements 
1. No reasonable alternative. 
The above analysis establishes that whether a threat is le-
gally improper should turn on whether it is contrived. For any 
threat to induce modification, it must be the case that Mr > Tr. 
For modifications without mutual consideration, by definition 
Cr > Mr, and thus we know Cr > Mr > Tr. For modifications with 
mutual consideration, duress doctrine also requires proving that 
the threat recipient had “no reasonable alternative,” which 
means that the threatened action would leave the recipient sig-
nificantly worse off than under the contract and thus means 
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that Cr > Tr.56 Because such a threat could be necessary only if 
Cr > Mr, this element establishes that Cr > Mr > Tr. As I note in 
Part I.C, this value ranking is a requisite factual premise to 
show that the situation involved a true threat rather than a bo-
nus. Alternatively, one might have direct evidence that Cr > Mr, 
in which case we can infer that Cr > Tr because Mr > Tr.57 Direct 
evidence that Cr is significantly greater than Mr should thus 
suffice to satisfy the no-reasonable-alternative test. 
Administrative grounds explain why the law requires a sig-
nificant difference even though a small difference could result in 
some small harm. In a world with costless, perfectly accurate ad-
judication, all contrived threats would be condemned even if the 
harm were small. But we do not live in such a world. Sometimes 
a court will mistakenly treat an uncontrived warning like a con-
trived threat. A significance threshold assures that the potential 
harm is large enough to exceed both litigation costs and the 
overdeterrence effects that can result from inevitable errors in 
adjudicative fact-finding. The significance threshold thus reduc-
es the overdeterrence of uncontrived warnings that might be 
mistaken for contrived threats, but it does so at a cost of under-
deterring contrived threats with small harms. 
For modifications without mutual consideration, contract 
law does not require proving the no-reasonable-alternative test. 
This makes sense because, as the proof above shows, any modifi-
cation without mutual consideration necessarily satisfies the 
condition that Cr > Mr > Tr. Because this automatically follows, 
litigation costs or errors in establishing this condition are likely 
to be far lower than for modifications with mutual consideration. 
If contract-law remedies fully satisfied the expectation 
damages goal of putting the recipient in the same position as 
contract performance would put him, a threat to breach a con-
tract would mean Cr = Tr, and thus the necessary premise that 
Cr > Tr could not be satisfied and a recipient would never agree 
to a modification for which Cr > Mr. Accordingly, threats to 
breach a contract can cause the relevant problem only when con-
tract remedies are undercompensatory—which alas is often the 
 
 56 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1) (1981). 
 57 Some argue that the no-reasonable-alternative test is unnecessary because the 
recipient would never agree to the modification unless he had no reasonable alternative. See, 
for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of 
Credible Threats, 33 J Legal Stud 391, 423 (2004). But that assumes the modification 
was adverse to the recipient when it was made, which is not necessarily true for modifi-
cations with mutual consideration. See note 54. 
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case given litigation costs and delays, uncertain adjudication, lim-
ited defendant assets, and doctrines that sometimes provide dam-
ages below expectation levels. For modifications without mutual 
consideration, we know that Cr > Mr, so we can infer that legal 
remedies must not have been fully compensatory, or else the recip-
ient would not have agreed to the modification. For modifications 
with mutual consideration, courts instead often require evidence 
that the contract remedy is significantly undercompensatory.58 
One might think that the underlying problem of inadequate 
contract remedies indicates that the solution should be to in-
crease contract remedies rather than to have doctrines that po-
lice modifications. However, that solution would not help when, 
as in the Wolf case, the contrived threat is not a threat to breach 
the contract. Moreover, even when the contrived threat is a threat 
to breach, that solution may be undesirable or unattainable. Op-
timal contract remedies can only minimize the sum of under-
deterrence and overdeterrence of breaches, thus making under-
compensatory remedies inevitable in some cases. Nor will 
increasing contract remedies help in cases in which the threaten-
er lacks sufficient assets to pay the damages. In any event, to the 
extent that actual contract remedies leave Cr > Tr, it remains 
desirable to prevent modifications caused by contrived threats to 
breach contracts. The fact that different contract remedies might 
have deterred the threats to breach does not alter the desirabil-
ity of voiding modifications induced by contrived threats that 
are made, given actual contract remedies. 
The fact that the problem of contrived threats to breach con-
tracts arises only when there are inadequate contract remedies 
also explains why, if preventing contrived threats is good for 
both parties, the parties’ initial contracts do not simply prohibit 
contrived threats. The answer is that the same inadequate con-
tract remedies would also fail to deter a breach of any promise 
not to make contrived threats. The only solution to that problem 
is to make modifications produced by contrived threats unen-
forceable. This is a solution that only the courts can supply be-
cause contract law provides that contracting parties can always 
agree to modify any contractual prohibition on modifications, 
thus making contractual prohibitions on future modifications 
unenforceable.59 
 
 58 See, for example, Austin, 272 NE2d at 535. 
 59 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311, comment a (1981). 
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2. Lack of objectively demonstrable reason or significant 
benefit. 
The legal standards indicate that, in general, a threat is 
improper and in bad faith unless there is an “objectively de-
monstrable reason for seeking a modification”60 or a “signifi-
cant[ ] benefit”61 from the threatened action.62 While having a 
demonstrable reason or motive for the threatened action sug-
gests that the threat was uncontrived, one might wonder about 
the requirement that the reason must be “objective” or must 
produce some concrete benefit. Why shouldn’t a purely subjec-
tive reason, like anger or spite, count if that motive would have 
dictated the threatened action even if no threat had been made? 
Suppose the Alaska Packers’ fishermen and the Wolf divorc-
ing home buyers were so angry about their situations that (even 
if no modifications were possible) they would have taken the 
threatened actions despite the fact that doing so would clearly 
harm themselves financially. If so, refusing to enforce such mod-
ifications because those reasons were subjective would actually 
harm the recipients if we were sure both that (a) these were the 
facts and (b) the anger itself was not contrived. 
What explains the rule requiring an objective reason or con-
crete benefit is that both those premises are untrue. First, 
claims about anger are subjective and easy to fake. Nor would it 
suffice to ascertain whether the anger was real; one would need 
to quantify its subjective effect to determine whether it would 
really outweigh the financial harm of taking the threatened ac-
tion. This creates a proof problem not only in hard cases, but al-
so as a systemic matter, because the proof problem could be arti-
ficially generated in every case. 
Second, even if anger would genuinely motivate the threat-
ened action, anger might itself be endogenous to the desire to cre-
ate a commitment or reputation that can make contrived threats 
more credible. Persons might work themselves into a lather be-
cause their anger makes it credible that they will carry out their 
threats, but their anger itself might be contrived. Or they might 
want a reputation for acting out of anger when they are crossed, 
so that their contrived threats will be more effective. Either way, 
anger itself can be contrived, and refusing to enforce modifications 
 
 60 UCC § 2-209, comment 2 (ALI 2014). 
 61 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(a) (1981). 
 62 See Part I.A. 
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induced by threats that were produced by contrived anger might 
thus deter those threats from ever being made. 
In short, in a world with costless, perfectly accurate adjudi-
cation, uncontrived warnings should be permissible even when 
based on nonpecuniary motives. However, in the actual world, it 
is hard to detect anger that is faked or contrived, so admitting 
subjective motives would lead to significant underdeterrence of 
contrived threats. To reduce this underdeterrence, contract law 
thus has sound reasons to deem a threat improper (that is, con-
trived) unless the threatened action is supported by some objective 
reason or concrete benefit other than inducing the modification, 
although the necessary cost is to overdeter some genuine, emo-
tional uncontrived warnings. 
3. Unfair modification terms. 
Another doctrinal issue is why contract law makes the fair-
ness of the induced modification relevant to whether it should be 
enforceable.63 Given the proof above, one might think that any 
contrived threat necessarily induces harmful modification and 
that any uncontrived warning induces beneficial modification, so 
that any separate inquiry into the fairness of the resulting modi-
fication seems unnecessary. 
However, there is a sound reason for this requirement. Even 
though the refusal to perform a contract may be an uncontrived 
warning, in that the threatener would prefer nonperformance if 
no modification were possible, a threat not to perform unless a 
particular modification is granted may be contrived because a 
lesser modification would have sufficed to induce performance.64 
For example, a cost increase might make a party unwilling to 
perform at the original contract price, but a threat not to per-
form unless given a price increase that vastly exceeds that cost 
increase would still be a contrived threat because a smaller price 
increase would suffice. Thus, to limit the threatener to the zone 
of uncontrived warnings, the law must also police the fairness of 
the demanded modification. This explanation provides concrete 
content to what “fairness” means here—it means the modification 
 
 63 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 89, 176 (1981). 
 64 Consistent with this conclusion, the Restatement provides: “Bad faith may be 
shown by proving that the person making the threat did not believe there was a reasonable 
basis for the threatened process . . . or that he realized the demand he made was exorbi-
tant.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment d (1981) (emphasis added). 
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should not exceed the minimum that is necessary for the threat-
ener to be willing to perform the original contract. 
For example, a Restatement illustration indicates that de-
spite a demonstrable increase in the market price for metal 
needed to make castings, it would be improper to threaten to 
withhold contractual supply of those castings unless the contract 
price were increased from 50 cents to 75 cents, in a case in 
which rivals sold the same castings for 55 cents but with several 
months’ delay.65 Given the demonstrable cost increase, the 
threat not to perform at the original contract price of 50 cents 
could well be uncontrived, and other Restatement provisions 
seem to treat such threats as proper.66 But the problem here is 
that the threat was not to perform unless the price were in-
creased to 75 cents, which does seem contrived because rivals 
were willing to supply the castings at 55 cents despite the same 
increase in market costs for metal. Thus, although a threat not 
to perform unless the contract price were increased to 55 cents 
could be an uncontrived warning, a threat not to perform unless 
the contract price were increased to 75 cents would be a con-
trived threat. 
E. Why Not Instead Focus on Whether the Threat Is Credible? 
Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar argue that 
contract modifications should always be enforced whenever they 
are induced by credible threats or by noncredible threats that 
are accurately perceived, limiting potential nonenforceability to 
noncredible threats that are inaccurately perceived.67 Other 
scholars reach a similar conclusion.68 Although their work is 
highly illuminating, such a credible-threat test differs from a 
contrived-threat test in important ways that make the latter 
more desirable. 
Whether a threat is contrived turns on a no-threat baseline: 
If no threat could have been communicated, what would the 
threatener have done? If she would have taken the threatened 
action, then the threat is uncontrived; if she would not have, 
then the threat is contrived. Whether a threat is credible instead 
 
 65 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b, illustration 5 (1981). 
 66 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b, illustrations 1–2, 4 (1981). 
 67 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 392–94, 417 (cited in note 57); 
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 717, 720, 727–28 (cited in note 5). 
 68 See Daniel A. Graham and Ellen R. Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic 
Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, 52 L & Contemp Probs 9, 11–12, 23 (1989). 
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turns on a post-threat baseline: After the threat is communicat-
ed, would the threatener actually carry it out if the modification 
were rejected?69 If she would, then her threat is credible; if she 
would not, then her threat is not credible. 
This is a critical difference because the contrived-threat test 
is designed to prevent such threats from being made in the first 
place. A post-threat baseline instead assumes that the threat 
would be made either way.70 The tests reach different results in 
cases when, if no threat could be made, the threatener would not 
take the threatened action, but if a threat were made, the 
threatener would carry it out. In such cases, the threat is con-
trived but credible, and a credibility test would thus wrongly en-
force any modification that it induced. In contrast, my contrived-
threat test would not enforce the induced modification, because 
denying threateners any benefits from making such threats 
would desirably deter such threats from ever being made. 
1. Why contrived threats can be credible. 
A contrived threat can be credible whenever the act of mak-
ing the threat makes the threatener more likely to take the 
threatened action if no modification is given. Making a threat 
can have this effect for many reasons. 
a) A contrived threat can be credible when staged.  A con-
trived threat not to perform a contract is generally carried out in 
stages that make it credible because the victim’s refusal to modi-
fy at each stage is itself not credible.71 Suppose, for example, 
that withholding performance is unprofitable standing alone, so 
that a onetime threat to never perform might not seem credible. 
 
 69 See Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 722 (cited in note 5) (“Credibility 
is evaluated with an eye to the hypothetical temporal moment when the threat fails to 
induce the threatened party to surrender.”); id at 742 (“Our analysis suggests that the 
correct baseline . . . is not the position of the threatened party prior to the threat, but 
rather the position that she would be in if she were to reject the threat.”); id at 742 n 51 
(stressing that Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar are using a “post-threat baseline”). 
 70 See id at 742 (observing that Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s post-threat “position 
takes the existence of a threat to be part of the unfortunate but relevant reality in which 
the dilemma has to be resolved”). 
 71 Professor Lucian Arye Bebchuk established a similar point for threats to sue. See 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to 
Sue, 25 J Legal Stud 1, 4–25 (1996). Threats of contract nonperformance are even more 
credible than litigation threats because, while in Bebchuk’s model both sides incur equal 
costs at each litigation stage, in the contract situation usually the victim immediately 
incurs large costs from nonperformance while the threatener incurs costs only later if the 
victim sues or does not pay. 
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Nonetheless, a threatener usually withholds contract perfor-
mance only one day at a time. The threat to continue doing so 
each day is credible when a victim has no reasonable alterna-
tive, because each day the victim’s refusal to modify is not credi-
ble, given that the victim is harmed each day he refuses to modi-
fy. Moreover, the threatener usually suffers harm only later if 
the victim sues or does not pay—possibilities that can be dis-
counted because they would require the victim to follow through 
with a noncredible threat to refuse modification. Thus, continu-
ing to withhold performance, even though unprofitable standing 
alone, can become profitable (and thus credible) because it is 
expected to result in a profitable modification. In a sense, the 
threat is credible each day because it creates a profitable repu-
tation for credibility on following days.72 
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that such a staged 
breach would be credible even though each stage is costly to the 
threatener, but because they employ a credibility test, they 
reach the mistaken conclusion that modifications induced by 
such breaches should be enforceable.73 Their conclusion is mis-
taken because enforcing the modification encourages such con-
trived threats even though the prospect of them makes both par-
ties worse off. A contrived-threat test instead correctly denies 
enforcement of the modification because no stage of the threat-
ened action would have occurred without the prospect of such a 
modification, given that each stage of the threatened action is 
unprofitable but for its ability to induce modification. 
b) A contrived threat can be credible because it creates a 
reputation for carrying out future threats.  Once a threat is 
made, failing to carry it out can have reputational effects for fu-
ture threats. It can thus be credible that a threatener will carry 
out a contrived threat (even though the threatened action is di-
rectly unprofitable) because the threatener profits from enhanc-
ing the credibility of her future threats. 
 
 72 The same theory works for more-violent threats. The loan shark need not resort 
immediately to killing the nonpaying customer. Taking one finger off at a time can be 
more effective. Even though carrying out each threat to amputate a finger is unprofitable 
standing alone, it becomes profitable (and thus credible) because carrying out such a 
threat is likely to convince the victim that other fingers will follow and thus induce him 
to pay up. 
 73 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 417, 420–21 (cited in note 57) (con-
cluding that any modification induced by a credible threat should be enforced and that 
threatening such a staged breach is credible). 
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Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge not only that this 
factor can make unprofitable threats credible, but also that it 
creates an endogeneity problem for their approach, because it 
means that whether a threat is credible can depend on whether 
contract law enforces modifications induced by such threats.74 
Suppose that carrying out a threat will reduce profits unless it 
enhances a reputation for carrying out similar threats, which 
will lead to future profitable modifications. If so, then the credi-
bility of the threat turns entirely on whether contract law will 
enforce such modifications. If contract law does, then the threat 
is credible and the credibility test concludes that contract law 
correctly enforces such modifications. If contract law does not, 
then the threat is not credible and the credibility test concludes 
that contract law correctly refuses to enforce such modifications. 
Either conclusion is consistent with their test, which thus offers 
no basis for choosing between them. In other words, because 
their credibility test depends on whether contract law does en-
force the threat, it cannot provide independent grounds to decide 
whether contract law should enforce the threat. 
Although Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar correctly conclude that 
analysis should take this endogeneity problem into account, 
their credibility test offers no answer to the question of which of 
the endogenous solutions one should choose. The answer instead 
depends on whether deterring the threat is desirable, which a 
credibility test does not answer because credible threats can be 
either contrived (and thus harmful) or uncontrived (and thus 
beneficial). 
A contrived-threat test, in contrast, avoids any endogeneity 
problem. Contrived threats should make modifications unen-
forceable because in the no-threat world the threatened actions 
would not occur. Thus, no reputation could be developed, and 
profits from similar future modifications would be unavailable. 
The contrived-threat test accordingly always provides a clear 
conclusion that contract law should void modifications induced 
by such contrived threats, no matter how credible they may be. 
c) A contrived threat can be credible because making the 
threat creates emotional benefits to carrying it out.  Given human 
nature, the mere act of making a threat can alter the psychic 
benefits of carrying it out. A person who fails to carry out a 
 
 74 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 725–26 (cited in note 5) (noting that 
“credibility is endogenous” because “the legal definition of duress is one of the factors 
that can affect the credibility of the threat”).  
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threat loses face and may feel obliged to live up to her threat. 
Indeed, a threatener may develop a character for carrying out 
her threats precisely because it makes her threats more credible 
in ways that benefit her. Developing such a character can give 
threateners psychic benefits from carrying out threats that 
cause them to do so even when there are no future reputational 
benefits.75 
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that emotional fac-
tors can make it credible to carry out an unprofitable threat.76 
However, they do not consider the possibility that making the 
threat can itself change the emotional calculus. A threat would 
be contrived if, absent making any threat, the psychic benefits 
would not suffice to take the unprofitable action. But making 
this contrived threat can increase the psychic benefits from taking 
that action in a way that offsets the lost profits and thus makes 
the threat credible. Under the credibility test, this would make 
modifications induced by such threats enforceable, which would 
encourage such contrived threats because those modifications 
would be profitable for the threatener. In contrast, under the 
contrived-threat test, the threatener has no incentive to make 
the threat in the first place given that any modification would be 
unenforceable. The credibility test is thus less desirable, because 
the proof above shows that such contrived threats can only harm 
both parties. 
d) A contrived threat can be credible because of efforts to 
improve the threat’s credibility.  Contrived threats can be made 
in ways that create formal commitments to carry them out and 
thus make them credible. Threateners might also take earlier 
steps that increase the credibility of their contrived threats. For 
example, if a threat to breach would be contrived because the 
prospect of damages makes breach unprofitable, the threatener 
could take on debt that reduces the expected amount she will 
pay in damages. Alternatively, if a threat to breach would be 
contrived because performance would be profitable, the threat-
ener could take steps to increase her costs (or to fail to avoid 
 
 75 For example, a loan shark might find it advantageous to develop a character for 
severely punishing nonpayment, and that character might thus cause him to carry out a 
threat to kill someone who declines to pay, even though he hides the killing in a way that 
means it can have no reputational effects.  
 76 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 726–27, 756–57 (cited in note 5). See 
also generally Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an “Irrational” Breach 
of Contract, 11 S Ct Econ Rev 143 (2004). 
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such cost increases) in order to make performance unprofitable 
and thus make a threat to breach credible. 
Such efforts may ultimately make a threat credible and thus 
make the modifications induced by it enforceable under a credi-
bility test. If those modifications are sufficiently profitable to the 
threatener, they can make such efforts worthwhile even though 
the efforts would be unprofitable if the party were unable to 
make the threat. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that 
this effect is both possible and undesirable, and they recommend 
deviating from their credibility test when a party engages in 
efforts to make her threat more credible.77 A contrived-threat 
test would instead lead directly to the desirable conclusion be-
cause, absent an ability to make the threat, such unprofitable 
efforts to make a threat more credible would not occur. Accord-
ingly, without the ability to communicate such threats, neither 
those contrived efforts nor the threatened actions would occur. 
The threat is thus contrived and modifications induced by it 
should be unenforceable.78 
e) A contrived threat can be credible when there are low 
odds of great harm.  A contrived threat that is very unlikely to 
be carried out can still be credible enough to induce agreement 
given the magnitude of the threatened harm. For example, sup-
pose that someone puts a gun to your head unless you agree to 
modify a contract. Carrying out the threat harms the threatener 
because pulling the trigger gets her nothing, incurs legal risks, 
and costs a bullet. But suppose there are 1 percent odds that the 
threatener will carry out the threat because of reputational ef-
fects or because she may be irrational, deranged, or on drugs. 
Even if you accurately perceive those low odds, you would likely 
consent to modification because a 1 percent risk of death exceeds 
the harm from the modification. The threat can thus be credible 
enough to induce modification even though it is clearly con-
trived. A contrived-threat test instead makes the modification 
 
 77 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 732–34 (cited in note 5); Bar-Gill and 
Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 415–17 (cited in note 57). See also Mark Seidenfeld and 
Murat C. Mungan, Duress as Rent-Seeking, 99 Minn L Rev 1423, 1427 (2015) (concluding 
that credible threats should be deemed wrongful when the costs of making the threat 
credible and carrying it out exceed the benefits of the threatened action). 
 78 Consistent with my conclusion, courts have interpreted the good faith require-
ment of a “legitimate commercial reason” to mean a reason “outside the control of the 
party seeking the modification.” T & S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc v Pic-Air, Inc, 790 
F2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir 1986). Thus, a party cannot bootstrap itself into a valid reason 
for breaching by contrived efforts to incur costs, debts, or commitments that make per-
formance unprofitable. 
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void and thus eliminates any incentive to make the threat in the 
first place. Enforcing such modifications would instead encour-
age such threats, which clearly seems undesirable. 
2. Why contrived threats should be deterred even if they 
are not credible. 
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s theory also has problematic impli-
cations for noncredible threats. First, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 
conclude that modifications produced by noncredible threats 
should also be enforceable whenever victims accurately per-
ceived the noncredibility of the threat.79 They reason that, in 
such cases, the threat could not have induced the modification. 
Their approach thus limits the possible scope of duress doctrine 
to noncredible threats that the victims wrongly perceived to be 
credible. 
Efforts to make contrived threats look credible are certainly 
harmful. For example, a threatener might claim that her costs 
or debts are higher than they are, suggesting that she is likely to 
breach if no modification is obtained, even though breach is in 
fact unprofitable.80 Such claims are directly policed by contract 
doctrines that deem threats to be in bad faith when they are 
dishonest in fact.81 However, as the preceding Section shows, a 
contrived threat can be credible even if the threatener is com-
pletely honest about her situation, so contract law correctly also 
deems threats to be in bad faith whenever they are unsupported 
by objective reasons that would produce breach. 
Nor is there any reason for the law to get into complicated 
inquiries about whether a contrived threat was perceived to be 
credible. We are always better off if such a contrived threat is 
not made, rather than forcing the other side to guess about its 
credibility. If the contrived threat induces an adverse modifica-
tion, it must have been perceived to be credible enough. As noted 
above, a threat can be credible enough even if the victim knows 
the odds are very low that it will be carried out and even if fully 
carrying out the threat is clearly unprofitable but it can be car-
ried out in steps. Courts inquiring about victims’ perceptions 
will often make errors, and may even suffer from hindsight bias, 
 
 79 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 393–94 (cited in note 57); Bar-Gill 
and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 727–28, 730–31 (cited in note 5). 
 80 See Graham and Peirce, 52 L & Contemp Probs at 11, 23 (cited in note 68). 
 81 See, for example, Roth Steel Products v Sharon Steel Corp, 705 F2d 134, 146 (6th 
Cir 1983). 
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because courts will have access to information that the victims 
do not have about the threats’ credibility. 
Moreover, even a contrived threat that fails to induce modi-
fication is harmful. If the contrived threat fails to induce modifi-
cation because the victim wrongly perceived that it was not cred-
ible, then the threat will be carried out, the prospect of which 
harms both parties ex ante. If the contrived threat fails to in-
duce modification because the victim correctly perceived that it 
was not credible, then there is still no benefit to allowing the 
threat; to the contrary, there is some harm because the threat 
leads to unnecessary conflict and negotiation costs. Because con-
trived threats never have any benefit and can create great harm, 
it is better for contract law to always deter them by eliminating 
any potential profits from making them. 
Second, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s approach produces no 
theory about which of the noncredible threats that are wrongly 
perceived to be credible should make induced modifications 
voidable; instead, they conclude that this issue turns on norma-
tive considerations beyond their analysis.82 My analysis provides 
a clearer conclusion: all modifications induced by contrived 
threats should be void, whether or not those contrived threats 
were credible. 
3. The credibility test does not fit contract law. 
A final advantage of the contrived-threat test is that it fits 
well with existing contract-law results, explaining why contrived 
threats are improper regardless of whether they will be carried 
out. In contrast, as Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge, their 
theory conflicts with current contract law.83 Indeed, their insist-
ence that credible threats should never void modifications di-
rectly conflicts with the no-reasonable-alternative element, be-
cause credible threats are the ones most likely to leave victims 
with no reasonable alternatives. Their approach thus immunizes 
the worst kind of contrived threat: a credible one that will be 
carried out only because the threat was made. Current law also 
 
 82 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 744 (cited in note 5) (“While we argue 
that whenever a threat is credible the deal should be enforced, we do not argue that 
whenever a threat is not credible, the deal should not be enforced. . . . A normative theo-
ry . . . is necessary to determine which among these noncredible threats are coercive.”); 
id at 731–32. 
 83 Id at 719, 721, 737, 753–54; Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 392–94, 
422–23 (cited in note 57). 
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eschews any separate inquiry into whether a reasonable person 
would have perceived the threat to be credible, concluding (as I 
do) that it suffices if the threat actually induced the modification.84 
F. Comparing Other Proposed Tests 
1. Professors Nozick and Schelling on threats versus 
warnings. 
My contrived-threat test is partly related to the distinction 
that Nozick, Schelling, and others have drawn between imper-
missible “threats” on the one hand and permissible “offers” and 
“warnings” on the other.85 Nozick’s analysis is particularly im-
portant because it has influenced legal scholarship on contrac-
tual duress and unconstitutional conditions. However, their dis-
tinctions and analyses differ from mine in various important 
respects. 
First, while I use a pure prediction baseline to measure 
threats and warnings, Nozick and other philosophers combine a 
prediction baseline with a moral baseline, and thus their test 
condemns some “threats” that I would deem uncontrived warn-
ings. Although Nozick defines an impermissible “threat” to exist 
when the threatened conduct would leave the recipient worse off 
than the expected course of events, he defines “expected” to 
“straddle predicted and morally required.”86 Thus, his definition 
of an impermissible threat includes adverse deviations not only 
from what predictably would occur without any threat (which I 
would call a contrived threat) but also from what is morally re-
quired, even though it conforms to what would predictably occur 
without the threat (thus including what I deem uncontrived 
warnings).87 
 
 84 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175, comment c (1981) (“[T]he question 
is, did the threat actually induce assent on the part of the person claiming to be the vic-
tim of duress. . . . [I]t is not essential that a reasonable person would have believed that 
the maker of the threat had the ability to execute it.”). 
 85 See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton 
White, eds, Philosophy, Science, and Method 440, 447–58 (St Martin’s 1969); Thomas C. 
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 123 n 5 (Harvard 1960).  
 86 Nozick, Coercion at 447, 450 (cited in note 85) (emphasis in original). Other 
scholars likewise define threats by combining prediction and moral baselines. See, for 
example, Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 206–21 (Princeton 1987); Scott Altman, Divorcing 
Threats and Offers, 15 L & Phil 209, 211–15 (1996). 
 87 See, for example, Nozick, Coercion at 450 (cited in note 85). 
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One problem with Nozick’s definition is that he never de-
fines what is “morally required” (which he equates with “morally 
expected”), which adds a vague, conclusory element to his analy-
sis.88 Indeed, the typical contract modification is induced by 
threats to breach, which some might argue always deviate from 
what is morally expected,89 a conclusion that would mean that 
such threats are always impermissible and the modifications are 
always voidable.90 This would conflict with current law and be 
undesirable because the proof above shows that enforcing modi-
fications induced by uncontrived “threats” is desirable. 
No matter what he means by it, Nozick’s moral prong has 
bite only when it deems threats impermissible even though the 
threatened action conforms to the predicted course of events—
that is, only when it condemns uncontrived “threats.”91 The 
above proof shows that this bite is undesirable. To be sure, such 
uncontrived threats by supposition threaten action that deviates 
from some (unspecified) moral norm, which makes them unde-
sirable relative to compliance with that moral norm. But that 
moral deviation will by definition occur if the law prevents 
communication of uncontrived “threats” to take that deviant ac-
tion. Thus, enforcing modifications induced by such uncontrived 
“threats” to engage in immoral action will not only reduce such 
immoral conduct but also leave both parties better off, given the 
morally unacceptable conduct that would occur if such modifica-
tions could not be enforced. 
The fact that the threatened immoral conduct would occur 
may suggest that the underlying problem is that the law does 
not sufficiently penalize that conduct. But the remedy for that is 
increasing that penalty. If penalties are not sufficiently large to 
deter the immoral conduct, banning uncontrived warnings about 
that conduct will merely assure that the immoral conduct occurs 
 
 88 Id at 447, 450 (“In some such situations it will be unclear what P is morally ex-
pected to do, and hence unclear whether his statement is a threat or an offer.”). 
 89 See, for example, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and 
Promise, 120 Harv L Rev 708, 730–33 (2007). 
 90 If a threat adversely deviates from what is morally expected but not from what is 
predicted, Nozick suggests that the threat should be condemned whenever the victim 
would prefer what is morally expected to what is predicted. Nozick, Coercion at 451 (cit-
ed in note 85). Thus, if performance were morally expected, Nozick would always con-
demn threats to breach because victims prefer contract performance over breach. 
 91 If a threat adversely deviates from what is predicted, Nozick condemns the 
threat even if it does not deviate from what is morally required. Id at 453. Thus, the only 
effect that his morally required prong can have is to condemn some threats that the pre-
dicted prong would not. 
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instead of preferable modifications. Moreover, there are usually 
good reasons why the law does not impose greater penalties on 
immoral conduct, such as the fear that imprecision in application 
of the law will also deter desirable conduct. Thus, even optimal 
legal regulation will leave some immoral conduct undeterred, the 
harm of which could be reduced by enforcing modifications in-
duced by uncontrived warnings about that conduct. 
Second, these scholars often use a different prediction base-
line than I do. Although in parts Nozick uses the same no-threat 
baseline as I do,92 in other parts he and other philosophers use a 
pre-threat baseline that turns on what the victim would have 
expected to occur before the threat was made.93 Given that near-
ly every person who receives a threat to breach a contract expects 
contract performance before he hears about the threat, this pre-
threat expectation test would condemn all contract modifications 
induced by a threat of breach. This would not only deviate from 
actual contract law, but would also condemn desirable uncon-
trived warnings whenever the warnings were unexpected by the 
victims. Deterring such unexpected warnings would thus increase 
unexpected harm to the victims and prevent mutually desirable 
modifications to avoid it. Schelling uses a different pre-threat 
baseline to define a “warning,” which under his approach turns 
on whether, immediately before making the threat, the threat-
ener would have found it in her interest to take the threatened 
action.94 Schelling’s definition of a warning would thus include 
cases in which parties make contrived commitments that give 
them independent incentives to take the threatened action, 
which I note above should be condemned as contrived threats.95 
Schelling also draws no normative conclusions about what he 
calls threats because his work is instead about analyzing (quite 
brilliantly) the credibility and effectiveness of threats.96 
Third, Nozick concludes that contrived threats should be 
deemed permissible “offers” when they induce agreements that 
the recipient feels leave him better off than the predicted 
course of events.97 That is, even if a contrived threat results in 
 
 92 Id at 453–57. 
 93 Id at 447–53. See also Wertheimer, Coercion at 207 (cited in note 86). 
 94 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict at 123 n 5 (cited in note 85). 
 95 See Part I.E.1.d. 
 96 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict at 121–23 (cited in note 85). 
 97 Nozick, Coercion at 448–49 (cited in note 85). 
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Cr > Tr, Nozick concludes that it should count as a permissible 
offer if Mr > Cr. 
However, there is no benefit from creating a legal exception 
for contrived threats that induce modifications that leave the re-
cipient better off. If it were really true that Mr > Cr, then the 
threatener could always induce the modification without any 
contrived threat. Indeed, the fact that the threatener felt a 
threat was needed suggests that she really believed Cr > Mr. 
The best way to test whether the recipient really believed 
Mr > Cr would be to prevent contrived threats that leave the re-
cipient worse off than Cr. This preserves the recipient’s autono-
my right to choose for himself whether he prefers the modifica-
tion, rather than having that right turn on whether a court 
concludes that the recipient really believes the modification 
made him worse off. 
Fourth, and related to all the above points, Nozick believes 
that the distinction between impermissible threats and permis-
sible offers or warnings is inescapably normative.98 Many other 
scholars share this view.99 In my account, however, the distinc-
tion is purely factual: it turns solely on what, in a no-threat 
world, the threatener would have done. This factual distinction 
has, as I prove above, clear normative implications given the 
consequences that flow from it. But the distinction is a factual 
one that does not require independent normative criteria. That 
is critical because we are dealing with threatened actions that 
are otherwise lawful and thus by definition are within the 
bounds in which contract law and constitutional law allow par-
ties and governments to pursue their own normative goals. 
2. Changed circumstances. 
Other leading scholars conclude that the enforceability of 
modifications should depend on the existence of various types of 
changed circumstances. Although such changed circumstances 
often correctly indicate an uncontrived warning that should lead 
to enforceability, their tests are under- and overinclusive. 
 
 98 Id at 449. 
 99 See, for example, Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual 
Obligation 95–99 (Harvard 1981); Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1446 n 133 (cited in note 
6) (collecting sources). 
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Professor Alan Schwartz concludes that modifications should 
be enforceable when prompted by any changed circumstances.100 
However, many changed circumstances will not even make per-
formance unprofitable, let alone so unprofitable that threateners 
would not perform even if modification were impossible. Unless the 
changed circumstances have that effect, threats not to perform are 
contrived threats despite changed circumstances, and enforcing 
such modifications under Schwartz’s overinclusive test will thus 
encourage contrived threats, with undesirable consequences. 
Judge Richard Posner concludes that modifications should 
be enforceable when changed circumstances make performance 
by a willing party impossible without a modification.101 However, 
even if performance is possible, it will not actually occur if 
changed circumstances make performance less profitable than 
breach. In such cases, the threat to breach is an uncontrived 
warning and failing to enforce modifications under Posner’s under-
inclusive test will thus lead to breaches that both parties find 
worse than modification. 
Professor Varouj Aivazian, Professor Michael Trebilcock, 
and Judge Michael Penny conclude that modifications should be 
enforceable only when changed circumstances affect risks that 
are remote and for which the threat recipients are superior risk 
bearers.102 They reason that other modifications reallocate con-
tractual risks away from superior risk bearers.103 However, even 
when their test is not met, threateners would (if modification 
were impossible) still breach when doing so would be more prof-
itable than performance. When that is so, threats to breach are 
uncontrived warnings, and their underinclusive test will prevent 
desirable modifications. True, modifications induced by such 
contrived warnings may, as they argue, reallocate risks in a way 
that is less efficient than the original contracts.104 But if the 
modifications are prevented, we will not get performance of the 
original contracts. We will get breaches that all parties regard as 
 
 100 Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete 
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271, 312 (1992). 
 101 Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J Legal Stud 
411, 421–22 (1977). 
 102 Varouj A. Aivazian, Michael J. Trebilcock, and Michael Penny, The Law of Con-
tract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 Osgoode 
Hall L J 173, 196–97 (1984). 
 103 See id at 193–94. 
 104 Id (arguing that because risks in a contract presumably “have been assigned to 
the superior . . . risk bearer,” allowing a party to “reallocate [risk] to the other party by 
contract modification” creates inefficiencies). 
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worse than the modifications. Aivazian, Trebilcock, and Penny 
worry that the prospect of risk reallocation through modification 
will reduce threateners’ incentives to avoid risks that make 
them want to breach.105 But the contrived-threat test eliminates 
that concern by deeming threats contrived if nonperformance 
became advantageous only because of changed circumstances 
that resulted from contrived decisions that the threatener would 
have found unprofitable but for the ability to make a threat that 
induces modification.106 
Professor Jason Johnston concludes that modifications 
should be enforceable only when sought because changed circum-
stances made performance of the original contract unprofitable.107 
Although such changes in circumstances often indicate an uncon-
trived warning, his test is both under- and overinclusive. 
First, even if changed circumstances make performance of 
the original contract unprofitable, sometimes the prospect of 
paying expectation damages is even less profitable. In such situ-
ations, threats not to perform are contrived despite those 
changed circumstances, and enforcing modifications under 
Johnston’s test will encourage such contrived threats, with un-
desirable consequences. Thus, courts are right to require further 
evidence that unprofitability really would have led to nonper-
formance even if no modification were possible.108 
Second, even if changed circumstances do not make perfor-
mance of the original contract unprofitable, threats not to per-
form may be uncontrived warnings. For example, suppose that 
performing the contract remains profitable, but a third party 
has offered a higher price that would be even more profitable. 
Suppose further that the threatener prefers to take the higher 
price (and risk contract damages) over performing the original 
contract. If so, threats not to perform are uncontrived warnings, 
and refusing to enforce modifications will thus undesirably lead 
to breaches that make both parties worse off. Thus, contract law 
is right to enforce modifications when a party would otherwise 
take an even more profitable offer.109 
 
 105 Id at 194. 
 106 See Part I.E.1.d. 
 107 Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic 
Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S Cal Interdisc L J 335, 
339–41, 366, 375 (1993). 
 108 See note 34 and accompanying text. 
 109 See notes 30–32 and accompanying text. Posner would go even further and enforce 
any modification if the threat to terminate were prompted by a third party offering a 
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Third, even if changed circumstances make performance of 
the original contract unprofitable, that may not justify modifica-
tions induced by contrived threats unrelated to performance. 
For example, in Wolf, the buyers’ divorce was a changed cir-
cumstance that made performance unprofitable because they 
consequently had to resell the house.110 However, their threat 
was not to breach, but rather to complete the house purchase 
and then resell to an undesirable purchaser, which was even 
more unprofitable. That threat remained contrived, and thus the 
court was correct not to enforce the modification. 
II.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
The preceding Part establishes that contract-law standards 
correctly deem a threat invalidly coercive only if two elements 
are both met: (1) the threat was contrived (and thus “improper”) 
and (2) carrying out the threat would leave the victim signifi-
cantly worse off (thus meaning that he had “no reasonable al-
ternative” but to agree). This Part establishes that those same 
two elements should and do apply to the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine. Part II.A establishes that those elements 
explain the Spending Clause case law on unconstitutional condi-
tions affecting states. Part II.B provides a general proof of the 
normative desirability of the contrived-threat test and establish-
es that the same two elements explain the case law on unconsti-
tutional conditions affecting private persons. 
A. Unconstitutional Conditions Affecting States 
The Medicaid-defunding-threat decision follows straightfor-
wardly from the above contractual analysis. As the Court has 
noted, its Spending Clause precedents incorporate contract-law 
standards on duress, viewing the relationship between the fed-
eral government and the states as contractual in nature.111 The 
 
higher price. Posner, 6 J Legal Stud at 424 (cited in note 101). His position is overbroad 
because such threats are uncontrived warnings only if the higher price would have led 
to nonperformance (despite the risk of contract damages) even if no threat could be 
communicated. 
 110 See Part I.B.2. 
 111 See note 4 and accompanying text. A key premise for the contractual characteri-
zation was that the federal government could not directly command states to accept the 
Medicaid expansion. National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 
2566, 2602 (2012) (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (“NFIB”). If the fed-
eral government could do so, it would not matter whether the defunding threat was coer-
cive, because coercion would be permissible. 
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threat to defund Medicaid unless states accepted the Medicaid 
expansion thus violated the relevant standard if it was the case 
both that (1) the threat was contrived and (2) carrying out the 
threat would have left the states significantly worse off. 
1. Findings showing a contrived threat. 
Much of Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion in National 
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius112 (“NFIB”) fo-
cused on the second element because it was important to distin-
guish some key precedent.113 But before doing so, he offered an 
analysis that established that the first element was met by the 
threat to take away preexisting Medicaid funds, stating: 
[Proposition 1] The States claim that this threat serves no 
purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up for 
the dramatic expansion in health care coverage effected by 
the Act. Given the nature of the threat and the programs at 
issue here, we must agree. [Proposition 2] We have upheld 
Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of funds on the 
States’ complying with restrictions on the use of those 
funds, because that is the means by which Congress ensures 
that the funds are spent according to its view of the ‘‘general 
Welfare.’’ [Proposition 3] Conditions that do not here govern 
the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that 
basis. When, for example, such conditions take the form of 
threats to terminate other significant independent grants, 
the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring 
the States to accept policy changes.114 
Proposition 1 was a finding that the threat had “no purpose” but 
to force states to accept the modification.115 This finding meant 
the threat was contrived—that is, absent an ability to make the 
threat, Congress would not have terminated preexisting Medi-
caid. Proposition 2 further indicates that threats are acceptable 
when they reflect Congress’s view that the use of its funds ad-
vances the general welfare only if certain conditions are met. 
 
 112 132 S Ct 2566 (2012). 
 113 Id at 2604–05 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 114 Id at 2603–04 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (material in 
brackets added). 
 115 Id at 2603 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). For a similar conclu-
sion, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study 
in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 Tex L Rev 1283, 1323, 1334–35 (2013). 
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Such a congressional view would indicate that Congress would 
find cutting off funding preferable to continuing it without con-
ditions, which would make a threat to cut off funding an uncon-
trived warning of what Congress would do if attaching the con-
dition were impossible. Proposition 3 concludes that this is not 
the case when Congress threatens to terminate significant inde-
pendent grants, which Congress would have no reason to discon-
tinue but for the fact that the threat pressures states to agree to 
a change, thus indicating a contrived threat. 
The conclusion that the threat to eliminate preexisting 
Medicaid funds was contrived seems entirely correct. There was 
no evidence that any significant faction in Congress (let alone a 
congressional majority) preferred eliminating Medicaid over 
having preexisting Medicaid continue. The threat to defund 
preexisting Medicaid was thus a contrived threat to engage in 
action that Congress would not have engaged in if it were unable 
to make the threat. Indeed, now that the Supreme Court has 
prevented the Secretary of Health and Human Services from 
threatening to eliminate Medicaid to induce states to accept the 
Medicaid expansion,116 we have not seen any congressional 
movement to eliminate Medicaid, even though Congress has got-
ten only more conservative since the Congress that enacted the 
ACA.117 To put it another way, Congress’s clear preference ranking 
was Medicaid Expansion > Preexisting Medicaid > No Medicaid. 
If unable to impose Medicaid expansion, then Congress would 
continue to provide preexisting Medicaid. Thus, the threat to in-
stead eliminate preexisting Medicaid was a contrived threat that 
penalized states’ choices not to accept the Medicaid expansion. 
Indeed, Roberts explicitly confirmed that he thought the threat 
was contrived when he concluded that, absent the condition, 
“[p]ractical constraints would plainly inhibit, if not preclude, the 
Federal Government from repealing the existing program.”118 
Conversely, suppose that we lived in a different world where 
Congress really thought that preexisting Medicaid was working 
so poorly that the nation would be better off eliminating it ra-
ther than allowing it to continue, but also thought that the Med-
icaid expansion would be better than both options. That is, sup-
pose its preference ranking were Medicaid Expansion > No 
 
 116 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2608 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).  
 117 See Holly Fechner, Managing Political Polarization in Congress: A Case Study on 
the Use of the Hastert Rule, 2014 Utah L Rev 757, 761–62. 
 118 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2606 n 14 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).  
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Medicaid > Preexisting Medicaid. In that imaginary world, the 
threat to eliminate Medicaid would be an uncontrived warning, 
which would make it thus constitutional. In this situation, con-
stitutionality would be desirable because if the law prevented 
Congress from communicating such an uncontrived warning, 
Congress would have eliminated Medicaid. By definition, that 
would leave the states worse off because the states preferred agree-
ing to the Medicaid expansion to having Medicaid eliminated. 
The actual case also involved an uncontrived warning that 
the Court did sustain. Namely, the Court held that Congress 
could threaten to withhold new Medicaid funds from states that 
did not agree to the Medicaid expansion.119 That threat was an 
uncontrived warning because the only reason Congress was will-
ing to offer the new funds was to get the Medicaid expansion. 
Thus, if Congress could not condition those new funds on the 
states’ expansion of Medicaid, then Congress would not provide 
the new funds at all. In other words, Congress’s preference rank-
ing was Medicaid Expansion > Preexisting Medicaid > Addition-
al Funding Without Medicaid Expansion. If Congress could not 
threaten to withhold additional funding unless the states ex-
panded Medicaid, this ranking means that Congress would just 
provide states with preexisting Medicaid funding. That makes 
the threat to withhold additional funding an uncontrived threat, 
which the Court allowed. A contrary ruling would have removed 
the option to choose Medicaid expansion with the new funds 
over preexisting Medicaid, which would have made states that 
preferred that option (as well as Congress) worse off. 
Roberts again confirmed this analysis because he concluded 
that while the threat to withhold new Medicaid funds was “offer-
ing” funds, the threat to deny existing Medicaid funds would 
“penalize” states.120 This distinction would not make sense if he 
were determining whether a threat was an offer or penalty rela-
tive to a baseline of what Congress legally could do, because 
Congress could legally withhold either source of funds. But it 
does make sense if we understand Roberts to be using a baseline 
of what Congress would have done absent the condition. 
Further confirmation was provided because Roberts’s analy-
sis of Steward Machine Co v Davis121 concluded that the threat 
there was constitutional for reasons that showed it was an 
 
 119 Id at 2607 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 120 Id (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 121 301 US 548 (1937). 
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uncontrived warning.122 In Steward, Congress assessed a tax to 
fund federal unemployment insurance, but it gave a tax credit to 
employers who paid into state unemployment plans.123 The 
Supreme Court held that the threat to withhold tax credits from 
employers in states without unemployment plans did not coerce 
states to adopt such plans.124 As Roberts correctly observed, that 
holding rested on the premise that “Congress was willing to di-
rect businesses to instead pay the money into state programs on-
ly on the condition that the money be used for the same purpos-
es.”125 This premise meant that the threat to withhold tax credits 
was an uncontrived warning because, if Congress had no ability 
to obtain the condition, Congress would have provided no tax 
credit rather than give unconditioned tax credits. 
To put it another way, in Steward, Congress’s preference 
ranking was Conditioned Tax Credits > No Tax Credits > Un-
conditioned Tax Credits. Thus, the threat to deny tax credits was 
just an uncontrived warning of what would happen if tax credits 
could not be conditioned on states’ provision of unemployment in-
surance. Prohibiting the conditioned tax credits would thus leave 
the states who accepted them worse off because their acceptance 
showed that they preferred the tax credits with conditions to no 
tax credits at all. In other words, offering the conditioned tax 
credits to states added an option that they might prefer to the 
zero tax credits that they would otherwise get, rather than pe-
nalizing a choice not to adopt state unemployment insurance by 
withholding unconditioned tax credits that would otherwise be 
forthcoming. Accordingly, Steward correctly concluded that 
Congress was using “temptation” (adding options preferable to 
the but-for world) rather than “coercion” (imposing penalties 
worse than the but-for world).126 
The joint dissenting opinion in NFIB wrongly suggested in 
dicta that the sole test of coercion was whether the no-
reasonable-alternative test was met.127 That test could condemn 
uncontrived warnings about denials of funding or tax credits, 
which would leave states worse off because the states would 
then suffer those denials even when they preferred to agree to 
 
 122 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2603 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 123 Steward, 301 US at 574–76. 
 124 Id at 585, 591. 
 125 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2603 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). See 
also Steward, 301 US at 587–91. 
 126 Steward, 301 US at 589–90. 
 127 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2661 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
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the conditions necessary to avoid them. It would also deviate 
from the underlying contract-law principles (which the joint 
opinion agreed applied128) because those principles also require a 
contrived (that is, improper) threat. However, this suggestion 
was dicta because other parts of the joint opinion indicate that 
the dissenting justices believed the actual congressional threat 
to eliminate preexisting Medicaid was contrived, stating that 
“Congress would surely” not want to leave our “most vulnerable 
groups . . . out in the cold” by eliminating Medicaid in states 
that did not accept the expansion.129 Because the actual threat 
was contrived, eliminating the ability to make it would not (and 
did not) result in a Medicaid elimination that would harm the 
states. In any event, because the votes in the Roberts opinion 
were necessary for the judgment, those votes limit the holding of 
unconstitutionality to threats that not only leave states with no 
reasonable choice but also are contrived. 
South Dakota v Dole130 is not to the contrary. To be sure, one 
might reasonably conclude that the threat in that case—to 
withhold federal highway funding from states that did not ban 
underage drinking131—was a contrived threat. But some Su-
preme Court language suggests that the Court did not think 
so.132 More important, as stressed above, a threat can be invali-
dated as coercive only when it meets two elements: (1) the threat 
must be contrived and (2) carrying out the threat must leave the 
states significantly worse off (meaning that they had no reasona-
ble alternative but to agree). Thus, even if the threat in Dole 
were contrived, that threat could not be invalidated unless it also 
met the second element, and Dole focused on the conclusion that 
this second element was not met, as the next Section details.  
2. The lack of a reasonable alternative. 
The rest of Roberts’s analysis in NFIB established that the 
second necessary element, the lack of a reasonable alternative, 
 
 128 Id at 2659–60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
 129 Id at 2665 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).  
 130 483 US 203 (1987). 
 131 Id at 205. 
 132 Roberts distinguished Dole because there the condition requiring a twenty-one-
year-old drinking age was directly related to Congress’s purpose in making sure that its 
highway spending advanced safe interstate travel. NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2604 (Roberts, 
joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). Such a purpose suggests that Congress might 
prefer eliminating highway funding over funding highways on which underage drinkers 
could drive. If so, then the threat in Dole was an uncontrived warning. 
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was also met, finding that states had “no real option but to ac-
quiesce” because eliminating federal Medicaid funding threat-
ened a “loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.”133 
This finding confirms that (as under contract law) the Spending 
Clause version of this element merely requires showing that 
carrying out the threat would have left the victim significantly 
worse off. Roberts distinguished Dole on the ground that there the 
threat was to eliminate funding that was less than 0.5 percent of 
the state’s budget.134 The opinion thus suggests that losing less 
than 0.5 percent of a state’s budget does not leave it significantly 
worse off, but that losing 10 percent of a state’s budget does. 
As noted above in the discussion of the underlying contract 
standards, where to draw the line on what counts as a signifi-
cant difference turns on administrative grounds related both to 
litigation costs and to concerns that inevitable inaccuracies in 
adjudication (such as incorrectly finding a threat to be contrived) 
might create overdeterrence problems.135 It thus makes sense to 
limit the doctrine to cases with significant underdeterrence con-
cerns; if carrying out a threat would leave states less than 0.5 
percent worse off, then modifications induced by that threat 
cannot harm states any more than that. 
3. The critiques. 
In NFIB, the Government argued that the threat was unco-
ercive because the Medicaid expansion was so generous that it 
left the states better off.136 This parallels the Nozick argument 
that I rejected above: that a contrived threat should be deemed a 
permissible offer if it compels a party to accept an agreement 
that makes it better off.137 As the joint dissent pointed out, if the 
states really believed that the expansion left them better off, 
then a threat to take away preexisting Medicaid funds would 
have been unnecessary.138 The fact that (with the threat now 
removed) many states have not accepted the Medicaid expan-
sion139 confirms they must not actually prefer the expansion to 
 
 133 Id at 2604–05 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 134 Id at 2604 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 135 See Part I.D.1. 
 136 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2665–66 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).  
 137 See text accompanying note 97. 
 138 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
 139 See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Crafting a Narrative for the Red State Option, 102 
Ky L J 381, 381 (2014) (noting that, as of one year after the NFIB opinion, “fourteen 
states have rejected [Medicaid] expansion”). 
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preexisting Medicaid. To be sure, many argue that this state 
choice is financially irrational given the huge share of federal 
funding for that expansion. But the legal premise for coercion 
analysis is that states have a constitutional autonomy right to 
choose for themselves whether to accept the Medicaid expansion,140 
and in making autonomous choices, states are free to either assess 
the financial implications differently or make decisions based on 
reasons unrelated to finances. Sometimes we admire such deci-
sions as standing on principle. To allow such contrived threats 
when the federal government and courts believe the end result 
makes the states better off, but the states do not, would violate 
the posited constitutional autonomy right. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the threat could 
not be coercive because Congress has the legal right to eliminate 
Medicaid funding.141 But Spending Clause cases incorporate 
contract-law principles, and her argument conflicts with the 
contract-law principle that a threat to engage in otherwise-
lawful action can be coercive when it is contrived and leaves the 
victim no reasonable choice but to agree.142 Her argument also 
conflicts with the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, which 
invalidates many threats to take action (like cutting off funding) 
that is itself perfectly legal.143 These doctrines are correct be-
cause, no matter what Congress legally could do, a threat that 
deviates from what Congress would do without the challenged 
condition imposes a penalty on the state’s constitutional choice. 
Ginsburg also argued that the threat was not coercive be-
cause ‘‘Congress [had] not threatened to withhold funds ear-
marked for any other program.’’144 Roberts disputed her premise, 
concluding that preexisting Medicaid and the expansion were so 
different that they were not “all one program.”145 How can we tell 
whether programs are separate? The answer cannot turn, as 
Roberts correctly concluded, on how Congress “styled” the 
programs, because the whole point is to impose some limit on 
 
 140 See note 111. See also NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2601–02 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and 
Kagan) (plurality). 
 141 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2630 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
joined by Sotomayor). 
 142 See Parts I, III. 
 143 See Part II.B.2. 
 144 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2634 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
joined by Sotomayor). 
 145 Id at 2605 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
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Congress’s power.146 The answer must instead depend on why it 
functionally matters whether programs are separate. The reason it 
matters is that, if the threatened cutoff concerns an independent 
program, there is generally no reason to think that (absent link-
age to the threat) Congress would have wanted to discontinue 
that independent program, which means that the threat to do so 
is likely contrived. Thus, whether preexisting Medicaid should 
count as an independent program from the expansion turns not 
on formalisms but on whether we think Congress would have 
preferred to continue preexisting Medicaid in a world where it 
could not be linked to the expansion. Because Congress clearly 
would have preferred this, the two should count as separate 
programs. 
Ginsburg further claimed that the Court’s holding made no 
sense because Congress could instead have first repealed Medi-
caid and then offered a new Medicaid with the expansion.147 
However, her premise again conflicts with contract-law princi-
ples, which have long treated rescission and replacement as the 
same as modification.148 Nor is her premise accurate, because 
repealing Medicaid would still be a contrived threat if it would 
not have occurred absent the prospect of inducing states to agree 
to the expansion.149 
Finally, Ginsburg argued that the threat was constitutional 
because Congress and the states had already agreed that Con-
gress could amend Medicaid, and the expansion was a foreseea-
ble use of that power.150 This argument is quite different—it 
claims that coercion does not matter because voluntary state 
consent to the expansion was unnecessary, given that states had 
already prospectively agreed to any amendment in their earlier 
Medicaid contracts. This claim raises a different contract-law is-
sue: When a contract gives one side unilateral power to amend a 
contract, what are the limits on how that power can be exercised 
without the other side’s consent? Roberts’s opinion that such a 
unilateral power can be exercised to make only minor modifica-
tions is consistent with how contract law treats such provisions, 
 
 146 Id (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 147 Id at 2629, 2636 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by 
Sotomayor). 
 148 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b (1981). 
 149 After all, “a threat need not be verbally expressed; it may be perfectly clear from 
actions performed what the threat is.” Nozick, Coercion at 444 (cited in note 85). 
 150 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2630, 2638–39 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, joined by Sotomayor). 
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because without that implied limit the initial contract would 
contain illusory promises and thus be too indefinite to enforce.151 
This explains why past minor Medicaid modifications were per-
missible even when unilaterally imposed by Congress. 
4. King v Burwell.152 
In King v Burwell, the challengers argued that the ACA 
should be interpreted to deny federal tax credits to states that did 
not create their own health insurance exchanges.153 The Court 
concluded that Chevron deference did not apply because of the 
extraordinary-case exception.154 Because the IRS interpretation 
was clearly contrary to the views of the current Congress, this 
holding fits the pattern of the Court’s past cases, which have ap-
plied the extraordinary-case exception to Chevron deference if 
and only if the agency interpretation conflicts with current con-
gressional views on a politically important topic.155 As I have 
shown before, this understanding of the extraordinary-case ex-
ception fits other evidence that the true basis of Chevron defer-
ence is, and should be, a current-preferences default rule that 
applies only when the enacting legislature’s meaning is unclear 
and the agency action is a good proxy for current enactable pref-
erences.156 The Court then concluded that, when the relevant 
provisions were read in context with other statutory language 
and structure, the ACA did not threaten to deny federal tax 
credits to states that refused to create insurance exchanges.157 
But what if the statutory language had instead been ambig-
uous or (as the dissent argued) clearly did make such a threat? 
Such a threat would clearly have been contrived because (if 
making this threat were impossible) the enacting Congress sure-
ly would have preferred giving tax credits without this condition 
over denying tax credits. After all, as every justice recognized in 
 
 151 Id at 2605–06 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). See also Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 2, comment e (1981); Samuel Williston, 1 A Treatise on 
the Law of Contracts § 4:24 at 756 (Thomson/West 4th ed 2007) (Richard A. Lord, ed); 
Joseph M. Perillo and Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, 2 Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 at 142 
(West rev ed 1995). 
 152 135 S Ct 2480 (2015). 
 153 Id at 2487–88. 
 154 Id at 2488–89. 
 155 See Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation 
101–07 (Harvard 2008) (showing this pattern in the case law). 
 156 See id.  
 157 King, 135 S Ct at 2489–96. 
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NFIB, the overriding goal of the Congress that enacted the ACA 
was universal insurance coverage.158 The ACA imposes on all 
states community-rating and guaranteed-issue requirements 
that would drive healthier persons out of individual insurance 
markets unless coupled with both tax credits and mandates that 
keep the individuals in.159 Because the ACA conditions the man-
dates to buy insurance on the federal tax credits received, with-
holding tax credits would also have lifted the mandates for near-
ly 87 percent of individuals in states that refused to create 
exchanges.160 Withholding federal tax credits would thus have 
caused a collapse of state insurance markets that would have 
been precisely opposite to the congressional goal of universal 
coverage.161 Indeed, it would have triggered a collapse of individ-
ual insurance markets below the levels that prevailed before the 
ACA, which would have been contrary to the aims of even con-
gressional opponents to the ACA. 
The statutory threat that would have been created by the 
challengers’ interpretation would also have satisfied the no-
reasonable-alternative element because carrying out the posited 
threat would have left states significantly worse off. The direct fi-
nancial harm alone would have been 6 percent of the average 
state budget,162 twelve times the 0.5 percent in Dole and closer to 
the 10 percent that NFIB held was way past the constitutional 
line.163 Moreover, this financial harm would have been multiplied 
because the threatened action would also have caused individual 
insurance markets to collapse in the states that refused to estab-
lish their own exchanges. Not only would this have been harm-
ful to their citizens and state economies (and thus to state tax 
revenue), but in order to deal with all the newly uninsured, 
these states “would almost certainly find it necessary to increase 
 
 158 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2606 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id at 
2613 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Sotomayor, Breyer, 
and Kagan); id at 2664–65 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
 159 King, 135 S Ct at 2485–87, 2493. 
 160 Id at 2493. 
 161 Id at 2493–94, 2496. 
 162 Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action (JALSA), Jewish 
Social Policy Action Network (JSPAN), Jewish Council on Urban Affairs (JCUA), Boston 
Alliance for Community Health, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Jus-
tice, and Professors of Health Law and Constitutional Law in Support of Respondents, 
King v Burwell, Docket No 14-114, *9 (US filed Jan 26, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 
2015 WL 350366). 
 163 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2605 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id at 
2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
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[their] own health-care expenditures substantially,” and indeed 
the states would have been legally obligated to fund the newly 
uninsureds’ emergency care in state hospitals.164 The total harm 
to states would surely have exceeded the 10 percent that NFIB 
held was obviously unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, the same principles that explain why the Court 
was correct to hold the Medicaid-defunding threat unconstitu-
tional show that interpreting the ACA to threaten to withhold 
tax credits would have also made that tax credit threat uncon-
stitutional. One might try to argue that the two cases differ be-
cause in King the posited threat would have pressured states 
indirectly by withholding new tax credits from its citizens. But 
that was precisely the form of threat at issue in Steward, which 
held that the applicable legal standard to judge such threats 
was the same legal standard that NFIB applied to the Medicaid-
defunding threat.165 A holding that threats to deny new benefits 
cannot be coercive would also conflict with the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine, which often condemns withholding new 
benefits unless individuals waive their constitutional rights, and 
with underlying contractual principles, which often condemn 
threats to withhold new benefits to induce new contracts.166 In 
any event, the posited threat in King would not have merely 
withheld new benefits: given the associated regulation, it would 
have threatened a collapse of individual insurance markets be-
low levels that prevailed before the ACA. 
Interpreting the ACA as threatening to withhold tax credits 
would thus have conflicted with the canon requiring that stat-
utes be interpreted to avoid constitutional invalidity. Indeed, as 
Justice Anthony Kennedy correctly stated at oral argument, the 
modern canon of constitutional avoidance requires avoiding any 
interpretation that raises significant constitutional doubt or 
complexities, which would certainly have been raised by inter-
preting the ACA to make the posited threat.167 Further, even if 
 
 164 Id at 2657, 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting). 
 165 Id at 2603–05 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (applying the 
Steward “undue influence” standard); id at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito 
dissenting). 
 166 See Parts II.B.2, III. The correct baseline is a predictive baseline, not a historical 
baseline, although history is sometimes relevant to prediction. See text accompanying 
notes 227–28. 
 167 Transcript of Oral Argument, King v Burwell, Docket No 14-114, *16–18, 49 (US 
Mar 4, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 2399405) (“King Transcript”). See also Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 US 490, 508–09 (1979). 
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one (in my view, incorrectly) concluded that the statute threat-
ened to withhold tax credits so clearly that the canon of avoid-
ance was inapplicable, that threat would have to be invalidated 
as unconstitutional. Some have argued that the remedy for 
such unconstitutionality is unclear, but the routine remedy for 
unconstitutional conditions has always been voiding the condi-
tion, not denying the government benefit to everyone.168 The 
contrived-threat test explains why: such conditions are uncon-
stitutional only when the threat was contrived, which by defini-
tion means that (if unable to impose the condition) the enacting 
legislature would have preferred granting the benefit over with-
holding it. This same legislative preference ranking means that 
statutory default rules on severability, which require severing 
the statute in a way that is most likely to advance the enacting 
legislature’s preferences, would have required voiding the threat 
to withhold benefits, rather than voiding the grant of benefits 
for everyone.169 
 
 168 That was true both in NFIB and in all the cases considered in Part II.B.2. When, 
for example, the Court held it unconstitutional to withhold a tax exemption from veterans 
who refused to give a loyalty oath, the remedy was to give the tax exemption to all veter-
ans, not to deny it to all veterans. See Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 527–29, 531 (1958). 
 169 See Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules at 133–34 (cited in note 155). The dissenting 
justices simply ignored the fact that their interpretation would have resulted in a tax credit 
threat that was unconstitutional under their own interpretation of the unconstitutional-
coercion doctrine in NFIB. But one of the dissenting justices, Justice Antonin Scalia, sug-
gested at oral argument that his view was that no prior case had ever held that the 
Court could “rewrite” a statute when a clear provision was held unconstitutional. King 
Transcript at *17 (cited in note 167). However, no such rewrite would have been re-
quired: the condition “by the State” could simply have been voided in the provisions that 
calculate tax credits based on premiums and coverage months in an “[e]xchange estab-
lished by the State.” 26 USC § 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i). This would have involved, if any-
thing, less “rewriting” than voiding the language that created the unconstitutional Medicaid-
defunding threat. In any event, Scalia was mistaken in his claim that no prior case has 
ever held that a rewrite was the appropriate approach. In United States v Booker, 543 
US 220 (2005), which held that mandatory sentencing guidelines without jury fact-
finding were unconstitutional, the Court stressed that severability analysis does not re-
quire simply grammatically separating the invalid terms, but rather requires choosing 
the option that Congress would have most preferred, and it noted that this sometimes 
requires “modification of a statutory provision,” which the Court did by making the 
guidelines advisory. Id at 246–49. Scalia himself acknowledged that this decision re-
quired “rewriting” the statute. Id at 284–85 (Stevens dissenting in part, joined by Souter 
and Scalia). Moreover, Scalia favored a different interpretation that would have “rewrit-
ten” the statute as well: namely, adding jury fact-finding to the sentencing process on the 
ground that Congress would have preferred that instead. Id at 246 (pointing out that the 
dissent, joined in relevant part by Scalia, required the “addition” of provisions requiring 
jury fact-finding); id at 303–04 (Scalia dissenting in part). 
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B. Unconstitutional Conditions Affecting Private Persons 
1. A general proof. 
Unconstitutional-conditions cases involve situations in 
which the government has the power to deny a benefit and per-
sons have a constitutional autonomy right not to engage in cer-
tain conduct, and the government conditions the benefit on the 
person not exercising that right. Sometimes courts declare such 
conditions unconstitutional, but sometimes they do not. The es-
sential critique is that there is no coherent theory for explaining 
when courts should declare such conditions unconstitutional.170 
But the following proves that the contrived-threat test does pro-
vide a coherent theory of which conditions violate the constitu-
tional right not to engage in that conduct. 
All persons necessarily prefer unconditioned benefits over 
both conditioned benefits and no benefits. Persons who take 
conditioned benefits must also prefer them to no benefits, and 
thus for them Unconditioned Benefits > Conditioned Benefits > 
No Benefits. Persons who reject conditioned benefits must find 
them worse than no benefits, and thus for them Unconditioned 
Benefits > No Benefits > Conditioned Benefits. 
The government threatens no benefits unless persons accept 
the conditioned benefits. There are two possibilities depending 
on whether, if conditioned benefits could not be offered, the gov-
ernment would prefer to provide the benefits or not. 
a) Uncontrived warning.  If the government prefers Con-
ditioned Benefits > No Benefits > Unconditioned Benefits, then 
threats to provide no benefits are uncontrived warnings because 
if constitutional law did not allow the conditioned benefits, then 
the government would provide no benefits. Uncontrived warn-
ings that benefits will be denied to those who reject the condi-
tion thus impose no penalty relative to the but-for world; they 
instead add a conditioned-benefits option that some persons pre-
fer to the but-for option of no benefits. To be sure, some persons 
would be even happier with unconditioned benefits, but that is 
not what they would get if the conditioned benefits were uncon-
stitutional. Prohibiting the conditioned benefits would be bad for 
both the government and persons who would accept the condi-
tion, because they both must prefer conditioned benefits to no 
benefits. Prohibiting the conditioned benefits would not affect 
 
 170 See notes 3–7 and accompanying text. 
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persons who would reject the condition, because they would get 
no benefits either way. Allowing the conditioned benefits would 
thus make the government and some persons better off without 
making any persons worse off. 
b) Contrived threat.  If the government instead prefers 
Conditioned Benefits > Unconditioned Benefits > No Benefits, 
then threats to deny benefits to persons who do not accept condi-
tioned benefits are contrived because if constitutional law does 
not allow the conditioned benefits, then the government would 
provide unconditioned benefits. Such contrived threats penalize 
decisions to reject the condition by denying unconditioned bene-
fits that would have been given in the but-for world. Making a 
contrived threat thus has precisely the same effect as imposing a 
fine on those who exercise the constitutional right contrary to 
how the government wishes. 
For persons who reject the condition, the contrived threat 
means they will get no benefits, rather than the unconditioned 
benefits they would have received without the threat. This effect 
makes these persons and the government worse off because they 
both prefer unconditioned benefits to no benefits. 
For persons who accept the condition, the contrived threat 
means they will get conditioned benefits rather than uncondi-
tioned benefits. This makes these persons worse off because they 
prefer unconditioned benefits. But it makes the government bet-
ter off because it prefers conditioned benefits to the uncondi-
tioned benefits it otherwise would have given. The benefits are 
the same either way. The only difference is that, with the threat, 
the constitutional right would be exercised how the government 
wishes; whereas, without the threat, the constitutional right 
would instead be exercised how the person wishes. But the ex-
istence of the constitutional autonomy right by definition means 
that the Constitution embodies the normative principle that the 
right should be exercised how the person prefers, unless the per-
son receives benefits that he is willing to exchange for those 
rights. Adding a contrived threat converts the situation so that, 
without any difference in benefits received, the right is now ex-
ercised how the government prefers instead. The government 
has basically taken over the autonomy right without providing 
any offsetting benefits. The effect is identical to the effect that 
imposing a fine has on those persons who comply and thus do not 
pay the fine. Given the premise of the constitutional autonomy 
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right, the harm to these persons by definition exceeds the gain 
to the government. 
In other words, contrived threats force persons who accept 
the condition to give up their constitutional rights in exchange 
for nothing, because they get the same benefits they would have 
gotten in the but-for world where conditioned benefits were not 
possible. That necessarily violates the posited constitutional 
right. Indeed, the contrived threat harms all persons whether or 
not they accept the condition. Because the government condi-
tioned the benefits, it must find the policy gain from individuals 
who accept the condition greater than the policy harm from 
denying benefits to individuals who reject the condition, but that 
policy gain is unconstitutional by premise and thus illegitimate. 
The above argument depends on the existence of a constitu-
tional autonomy right, like the state right not to administer fed-
eral programs that was at issue in NFIB171 or the individual con-
stitutional rights at issue in unconstitutional-conditions case law. 
The same analysis would not apply if there were no constitutional 
autonomy right, but instead only a claim that the federal gov-
ernment was exceeding its Commerce Clause power. For example, 
suppose that Congress attached to federal spending or tax exemp-
tions a contrived threat to deny those benefits to individuals that 
do X, that individuals have no constitutional autonomy right not 
to be compelled to do X, but that compelling X lies beyond Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power. In that case, the contrived na-
ture of the threat means it is coercive—that is, regulatory—but 
there is no constitutional autonomy right to be free of such regu-
lation. In these cases, the question is instead whether regulatory 
uses of the federal spending and tax powers should be limited to 
the scope of the Commerce Clause power. In a system that gives 
Congress multiple overlapping enumerated powers, it is not at 
all clear why they should be. Indeed, NFIB itself held the con-
trary, sustaining a regulatory use of the taxing power to penal-
ize the nonpurchase of health insurance even though the Court 
struck down a mandate to buy health insurance as beyond the 
Commerce Clause.172 Consistent with this analysis, courts have 
not struck down contrived threats to deny benefits when the af-
fected conduct is not protected by any constitutional autonomy 
 
 171 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2601–02 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). 
 172 Id at 2594–2600 (Roberts). 
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right, but instead simply lies beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause power. 
c) Conclusion.  Accordingly, conditioning benefits on the 
waiver of constitutional autonomy rights violates those rights 
whenever the threat to deny benefits is contrived. Such condi-
tions do not violate those rights whenever the threat to deny 
benefits is uncontrived. Conditioning benefits reflects a con-
trived threat only when, if unable to make such a threat, the 
government would still provide the benefits. 
To put it another way, the contrived-threat test asks: In a 
but-for world where the condition could not have been adopted, 
what would the government have done? If the government would 
have offered the benefit in the but-for world, then denying the 
benefit imposes a penalty relative to that but-for world, and thus 
the condition unconstitutionally penalizes the exercise of a con-
stitutional right. If the government would not have offered the 
benefit in the but-for world, then denying the benefit imposes no 
such penalty and thus does not violate the recipient’s constitu-
tional right. 
This analysis shows the error in the general claim that the 
greater power includes the lesser. When threats are contrived, 
the greater power to withhold benefits entirely would not be ex-
ercised if the supposedly lesser power to condition benefits did 
not exist. In such cases, the power to condition benefits is not 
lesser at all because it enables the government to achieve effects 
that it would not achieve with the supposedly greater power. 
Nothing in the above proof requires relying on a contract 
analogy or on whether benefits were provided in the past. In-
deed, as we shall see, the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine 
fully applies to contrived threats to deny new benefits. The rele-
vant baseline entitlements are set by the Constitution, not by 
the past provision of benefits. However, one could properly deem 
those constitutional rights to be part of the initial contract be-
tween the government and its states and citizens. Further, re-
gardless of whether one characterizes the initial set of constitu-
tional entitlements as contractual, courts rely on contract 
principles to explain why that initial set of constitutional enti-
tlements can sometimes be waived (that is, modified) in ex-
change for government benefits. It thus makes sense to conclude 
that the same contract principles that allow some such modifica-
tions also limit others, so that the limits on contrived threats 
that induce agreements to modify initial contractual rights also 
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apply to contrived threats that induce agreements to modify ini-
tial constitutional rights. Accordingly, while not required for the 
proof, the contract analogy provides legal grounds for the same 
conclusions as that proof. 
To illustrate the above points, consider the classic case of 
Frost & Frost Trucking Co v Railroad Commission of California.173 
California could legally ban truckers from its highways, but 
truckers had (at the time of the case) a substantive due process 
right not to be ordered to be common carriers.174 The Supreme 
Court held that it was unconstitutional for a California statute 
to condition highway access on truckers’ agreeing to be common 
carriers.175 This holding has been critiqued because the truckers 
preferred being common carriers to lacking highway access.176 
But this critique wrongly assumes that, if unable to condition 
the benefit, California would have denied highway access to 
truckers. That seems implausible because trucking was highly 
valuable to the state economy. California’s preference ranking 
was surely instead Common Carrier Condition > Unconditioned 
Trucker Access > No Trucker Access. Therefore, if California 
could not impose the common carrier condition, California would 
instead give truckers highway access without that condition. 
The threat to deny truckers access was thus a contrived threat 
that harmed truckers because they preferred unconditioned ac-
cess to conditioned access. The Court thus correctly held the 
statute unconstitutional.177 
The threat in Frost was also entirely credible because the 
statute committed to carry out the threat and enough truckers 
complied that legislators had no incentive to repeal the statute. 
This is generally the case with unconstitutional conditions, and 
it illustrates both why contrived threats can be highly credible 
and why immunizing credible threats would produce the wrong 
result. 
 
 173 271 US 583 (1926). 
 174 Id at 592. 
 175 Id at 599. 
 176 See Adam B. Cox and Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions 
Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J 
Legal Analysis 61, 65 (2013). 
 177 Frost, 271 US at 599. Likewise, it is unconstitutional to condition the ability of 
corporations to do business in a state on waiving their access to federal court. Terral v 
Burke Construction Co, 257 US 529, 532–33 (1922). This holding is correct because, if 
unable to adopt that condition, a state would surely prefer having corporations operate 
in the state without the condition over having no corporations operate in the state. Thus, 
the threat to withhold the right to operate was contrived. 
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d) Avoiding analytical confusion.  An important analyti-
cal benefit of the above analysis is that it carefully separates the 
issue of whether withholding benefits coercively violates a con-
stitutional autonomy right not to engage in certain conduct from 
claims that (1) the threatened withholding is illegal, (2) the in-
duced agreement is independently illegal even if uncoerced, or 
(3) the induced agreement is legal even if coerced because there 
is no relevant constitutional right to be free of government coer-
cion. Past scholarship has found unconstitutional conditions in-
tractable in part because the scholarship has often mixed up 
these analytically separate issues. 
For example, suppose that the government provided a $100 
prize to the person who wrote the best essay arguing that the 
next president should be Hillary Clinton. The threat to withhold 
$100 seems uncontrived because the government would not pro-
vide the $100 if it could not attach the condition. Such a prize 
certainly would (and should) be unconstitutional. Does that 
mean the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine does properly 
condemn uncontrived threats? No, because the reason that this 
prize is unconstitutional is not that it coerces the prize recipient 
into giving up her constitutional right of free speech. Instead, it 
is because, even without coercion, such agreements violate equal 
protection because they fund speech favoring one political party 
over another, and they thus harm third parties even if they ben-
efit the agreeing parties. To test this, suppose that the govern-
ment instead equally funded political speech for both parties, as 
it has done with presidential campaigns. Then there is no con-
stitutional violation, because the funding is equal. For other ex-
amples, whether an uncoerced agreement is independently un-
constitutional may be more difficult, but analytical clarity comes 
from seeing that such conclusions must rest on grounds other 
than coercion. Just as some private contracts are illegal as a 
matter of public policy even if they are not produced by duress, 
likewise some government-person agreements are independently 
unconstitutional even if not produced by coercion. Analytical 
clarity requires separating the issues. 
e) Difficulties of proof.  One might be concerned that it is 
hard to determine whether a threat is contrived. But often, as in 
Frost and the ACA cases, it is not that hard. Nor has this proved 
an insuperable problem for contract law, which has to resolve 
the same issue. Even when it is hard, a difficult factual question 
beats a vacuous standard. Difficulties of proof are also a common 
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issue in law. The possibility of adjudicative error creates over-
deterrence and underdeterrence, and we have our usual legal 
tools for dealing with this problem. Here, because determining 
whether a threat is contrived will produce litigation costs and 
adjudicative error that deter uncontrived warnings to some ex-
tent, it makes sense to limit this doctrine (like the contract doc-
trine) to cases in which underdeterrence concerns are significant 
by also requiring evidence that carrying out the threat would 
have left the victim significantly worse off. 
No matter how difficult it may be for courts to figure out the 
true facts, we cannot avoid the reality that some threats are actu-
ally contrived while other threats are not, and that the above 
proof shows the effects are always harmful for the contrived 
threats and beneficial for the uncontrived threats. This is im-
portant because it means that any legal test that one uses must 
be judged by the extent to which it successfully deters contrived 
threats while avoiding deterring uncontrived warnings. As we 
shall see next, the legal tests used by the Supreme Court do fairly 
well on this score. 
2. The fit with case law. 
Supreme Court standards on unconstitutional conditions 
correlate, albeit imperfectly, with a contrived-threat test. The 
application of those standards can be improved by clarifying 
that, in ambiguous cases, the standards should be interpreted to 
implement a contrived-threat test. 
a) Threats to deny funds used for government-desired ob-
jectives to those who exercise constitutional rights without using 
government funds.  A series of cases draws the following distinc-
tion: Congress can deny funds to persons who use federal funds 
for activities that Congress does not want to subsidize. But Con-
gress cannot deny funds to persons who use federal funds only 
for “activities Congress wants to subsidize” based on how those 
persons exercise constitutional rights that are not federally 
funded.178 Although the Court itself admits this “line is hardly 
clear” or “self-evident,”179 a contrived-threat test helps define the 
line. 
 
 178 Agency for International Development v Alliance for Open Society International, 
Inc, 133 S Ct 2321, 2328–32 (2013) (“AID”) (collecting cases). 
 179 Id at 2328, 2330. 
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Denying funds used for activities that Congress does not 
want to subsidize is an uncontrived warning because, if unable 
to impose that condition, Congress would not provide the funds, 
given that by definition it does not want to subsidize the activi-
ties. Allowing this condition will thus make the persons that 
want to accept it better off without harming anyone. 
Denying funds used for activities that Congress does want 
to subsidize is likely a contrived threat because, if unable to im-
pose the condition, Congress would likely provide the funds be-
cause the funds are by definition being used for activities Con-
gress wants to subsidize. The Court thus correctly prohibits such 
threats, rejecting the contrary view that such threats are consti-
tutional whenever the condition advances congressional objec-
tives.180 The problem with this contrary view is that all it means 
is that Congress prefers Conditioned Funds > Funding Activities 
Congress Wants > No Funding. Thus, if unable to use the chal-
lenged condition, Congress would still fund the activities it 
wants. Accordingly, its threat to instead cut off all funding is a 
contrived threat that should be prohibited. 
Consider Harris v McRae,181 which strongly suggested that 
Congress could not threaten to withhold nonabortion Medicaid 
funding from women who had abortions using nonfederal 
funds.182 Critics have argued that this conclusion offers no sound 
theory of whether the benefit of receiving nonabortion Medicaid 
should be included in the transaction.183 But this critique assumes 
that nonabortion Medicaid would have been withheld in the but-
for world without the condition. In fact, the Court was right that 
without the condition, Congress would prefer funding nonabortion 
Medicaid to eliminating Medicaid, which is demonstrably what 
Congress has actually chosen ever since Harris was decided. A 
threat to deny all Medicaid funding to those who had privately 
funded abortions would thus be contrived. Accordingly, no “bene-
fit” of nonabortion Medicaid would be caused by the posited con-
dition. Rather, such a condition would coercively threaten to 
take a benefit that would exist without any condition. 
This precedent further holds that, if the activities Congress 
wants to subsidize can be separated from the exercise of consti-
tutional rights without those federal funds, then Congress must 
 
 180 Id at 2328. 
 181 448 US 297 (1980). 
 182 Id at 317 n 19.  
 183 See, for example, Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1345–47 (cited in note 6). 
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allow such separation.184 Thus, Congress may not, by refusing to 
allow a separation of funds, use an uncontrived warning to pro-
vide funds only for activities it wants as an excuse for a contrived 
threat to withhold those funds because persons engaged in pro-
tected unfunded activities. That is, when separated funding is 
possible and legislatively preferable to denying all funding, a re-
fusal to provide separated funding would be a contrived threat. 
For example, Rust v Sullivan185 involved federal funding for 
family planning.186 The Court held that Congress could constitu-
tionally deny those funds to organizations that used the funds to 
counsel abortions, but only because Congress permitted those 
organizations to separate their activities so that organizations 
that provided abortion counseling could still get federal funding 
for other family planning activities.187 The refusal to fund abor-
tion counseling was an uncontrived warning because Congress 
preferred not to fund such activities. But had Congress instead 
refused to provide family planning funds to organizations that 
used separate nonfederal funds to counsel abortions, then that 
would have been a contrived threat because Congress did want 
to fund family planning services other than abortions.  
In contrast, in Agency for International Development v Alli-
ance for Open Society International, Inc,188 the Court held that 
federal funding to combat HIV/AIDS could not constitutionally 
be denied to organizations that refused to oppose prostitution, 
even though it could constitutionally be denied to organizations 
that used those federal funds to advocate the legalization of 
prostitution.189 The condition requiring that federal funds not be 
used to advocate the legalization of prostitution was an uncon-
trived warning because Congress did not want to fund such ad-
vocacy. But the condition denying federal funds to organizations 
that refused to oppose prostitution, even if they used those funds 
to combat HIV/AIDS in ways other than advocating the legaliza-
tion of prostitution, was a contrived threat because Congress did 
want to fund efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in other ways and was 
preventing the separation of such funding.190 
 
 184 AID, 133 S Ct at 2328–32. 
 185 500 US 173 (1991). 
 186 Id at 178–79. 
 187 Id at 196–97. 
 188 133 S Ct 2321 (2013). 
 189 Id at 2330–32. 
 190 See id. 
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b) Penalties versus subsidies.  The Supreme Court has held 
that conditioning government benefits on persons giving up their 
constitutional rights to travel, speak, or observe their Sabbath is 
an unconstitutional penalty,191 but that conditioning benefits on 
persons giving up their rights to strike or avoid mandatory home 
visits is a constitutional subsidy.192 Critics have argued that 
these two lines of cases are inconsistent.193 But whether they are 
consistent depends on factual predictions of what the govern-
ment would likely do if unable to adopt these conditions. 
In the former line of cases, it is clear that, if left with a 
choice between providing the benefits without the challenged 
condition and not providing the benefits at all, the government 
would choose to provide the benefits. Indeed, that is what has 
happened. The threats to deny those benefits were thus con-
trived threats to impose penalties relative to the but-for world. 
The validity of the latter line of cases turns on whether one 
thinks that, if unable to adopt the challenged conditions, the 
government would have preferred to withhold the benefits ra-
ther than provide them without those conditions. The Court 
found that Congress adopted the no-strike condition because it 
wanted to make sure food stamps were not used to fund strikes,194 
and it concluded that New York adopted the home visit condition 
because it wanted to make sure welfare benefits were being used 
to advance the best interests of children.195 If the desire to avoid 
such unwanted uses of federal funds were strong enough, then 
(if the conditions were unavailable) Congress might well prefer 
withholding these benefits to providing benefits without condi-
tions that would prevent unwanted uses. If so, then the threats 
to deny those benefits were uncontrived warnings, and the Court 
was right that they did not impose penalties. The Court’s implic-
it factual predictions are not self-evidently wrong, and if they are 
correct, the two lines of cases are normatively consistent. But 
courts should clarify the penalty/subsidy distinction by explicitly 
 
 191 See Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641–42 (1969) (addressing a condition affect-
ing the freedom to travel); Speiser, 357 US at 528–29 (addressing a condition affecting the 
freedom of speech); Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 US 
136, 146 (1987) (addressing a condition affecting the right to observe Sabbath). 
 192 See Lyng v International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, UAW, 485 US 360, 373–74 (1988) (addressing a condition 
affecting the right to strike); Wyman v James, 400 US 309, 326 (1971) (addressing a con-
dition affecting the right to avoid mandatory home visits). 
 193 See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1433–39 (cited in note 6). 
 194 International Union, 485 US at 370–71.  
 195 James, 400 US at 315–16, 318–19. 
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interpreting those terms to be measured relative to what the gov-
ernment would have done without the challenged condition. 
c) Nexus or germaneness.  Another line of cases concerns 
situations in which the government can deny a development 
permit outright, but cannot directly take some of the owner’s 
property rights without just compensation. The government 
threatens to deny the permit unless the owner agrees to a condi-
tion that exacts some of its property rights, such as requiring 
the owner to give an easement to the public. The Supreme Court 
has held that such threats are constitutional only if the condi-
tion’s purpose has an “essential nexus” to whatever purpose 
would be served by withholding the permit.196 The Court has 
stressed that this doctrine is just a “special application” of the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.197 More generally, the pat-
tern of the Court’s results on unconstitutional conditions indicates 
that the Court is more willing to uphold a condition that is “ger-
mane” to any government reasons for withholding the benefit.198 
If a nexus or germaneness exists between the condition and 
the withholding of the benefit, then a government that cannot use 
the condition would be more likely to advance the same purpose 
by withholding the benefit. Offering an unconditioned benefit 
would be less likely in the no-condition world because that would 
not serve the same purpose. Accordingly, a nexus or germaneness 
indicates that threats to withhold benefits are likely uncontrived 
warnings that should make the condition constitutional. 
If no nexus or germaneness exists between the condition and 
the withholding of the benefit, then an inability to use the condi-
tion would be less likely to cause the government to withhold the 
benefit, because the two serve different purposes. Offering an un-
conditioned benefit would be more likely in the no-condition world 
because giving the benefit would serve the same purpose as the 
benefit that would be given in a conditioned benefit. (For exam-
ple, providing a conditioned permit and providing an uncondi-
tioned permit both supply whatever policy gains flow from re-
al estate development.) Thus, a lack of nexus or germaneness 
 
 196 Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 386 (1994); Nollan v California Coastal 
Commission, 483 US 825, 837 (1987). 
 197 Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S Ct 2586, 2594 (2013).  
 198 Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1458–68 (cited in note 6) (summarizing cases). 
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indicates that threats to withhold benefits are likely contrived 
threats that should make the condition unconstitutional.199 
However, even if the condition and the denial of a permit 
further very different purposes, the government may value 
those different purposes equally, in which case different pur-
poses need not suggest a contrived threat. For example, Nollan 
v California Coastal Commission200 found no nexus between the 
purpose of the condition (providing public access to the beach) 
and the purpose of denying the permit (protecting visual access 
to the ocean).201 Although those purposes are different, the gov-
ernment might value them the same and thus value denying 
the permit similarly to providing a conditioned permit. If so, 
then holding such conditioned permits unconstitutional will 
prevent uncontrived warnings and result in the permits being 
denied outright.202 This is by definition worse for the property 
owner and the government, because both prefer the conditioned 
permit to no permit. We can thus improve the doctrine by inter-
preting nexus and germaneness to mean a similar government 
valuation of the condition and denial that is likely to make the 
threat uncontrived. 
Contrived-threat theory can also illuminate other features 
of the doctrine used to determine when conditioned permits are 
unconstitutional takings. In addition to imposing a nexus re-
quirement, the case law has stressed that there must be some 
“rough proportionality” between the condition and the social 
costs imposed by granting the permit.203 The explanation for this 
proportionality element under contrived-threat theory parallels 
the explanation for the contract doctrine that makes the fairness 
of a modification relevant to judging whether a threat used to 
induce that modification is enforceable.204 The existence of a 
 
 199 Some argue that any ban on conditioned permits without the needed nexus could 
easily be evaded by using eminent domain to take the easement and then giving the 
permit as just compensation. See, for example, Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1349 (cited in 
note 6). But if the threat to deny the permit were contrived, then the permit would have 
been given in the but-for world, and thus giving the permit would provide no compensa-
tion at all. Giving the permit would provide compensation only if the threat were uncon-
trived, in which case the conditioned permit would be constitutional anyway. 
 200 483 US 825 (1987). 
 201 Id at 836–37. 
 202 See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 346 
(Harvard 1995) (suggesting that the nexus doctrine may often result in permit denials 
that are worse than the conditioned permits that would otherwise be negotiated). 
 203 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595; Dolan, 512 US at 391.  
 204 See Part I.D.3.  
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nexus may show that a threat to deny a permit is uncontrived in 
the sense that the government would truly prefer no develop-
ment to an unconditioned development. However, a threat to 
deny a permit unless an unreasonably onerous condition were 
accepted could still be contrived, because a more reasonable 
condition would have sufficed to make granting the permit pref-
erable to denying it. This provides clearer guidance on what 
proportionality means: it means the condition should not exceed 
the minimum necessary for the government to be willing to 
grant the permit. 
Other issues raised in the recent Koontz v St. Johns River 
Water Management District205 decision can also be readily ex-
plained in terms of contrived-threat theory. First, Koontz made 
clear that threats that violated the nexus-proportionality test 
were unconstitutional even if the threatened party refused to ac-
cept the condition and thus the threatened permit denial was 
carried out.206 This fits contrived-threat theory because contrived 
threats are undesirable whether or not they are carried out, and 
the parallel contract doctrine prohibits them even when they do 
not induce modifications.207 Second, although the Koontz majori-
ty did not resolve the issue of how concrete the demand for a 
condition must be for it to be unconstitutional,208 the dissent by 
Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, discussed that issue at 
length.209 And although framed as an inquiry into the definite-
ness of the demand, the dissent’s reasoning indicated that the 
ultimate basis for the dissent’s conclusion was not the Govern-
ment’s wording, but rather was what the dissent saw as a lack of 
evidence that the Government would have granted the permit if 
it could not attach the condition.210 Again, this fits contrived-
 
 205 133 S Ct 2586 (2013). 
 206 Id at 2595–97. 
 207 See Part I.C (explaining why contrived threats are undesirable whether or not 
they are carried out); Part I.B (discussing the Wolf case, which condemned an improper 
threat even though it did not induce a modification). 
 208 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2598. 
 209 Id at 2609–11 (Kagan dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor). 
 210 The dissent summarized its analysis of this issue by saying that “[t]he District’s 
only hard-and-fast requirement was that Koontz do something—anything—to satisfy the 
relevant permitting criteria” and that if the District were not permitted to make the 
statements that it made, “the District would opt to simply deny permits outright.” Id at 
2611 (Kagan dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor). This reasoning in-
dicates that the dissent concluded that the Government was simply providing an uncon-
trived warning. 
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threat theory. If a threat is contrived, the fact that it might be 
phrased in equivocal or pleasant ways does not alter the unde-
sirability of the threat. Third, Koontz held that monetary condi-
tions could violate the doctrine, distinguishing them from taxes 
on the ground that the monetary conditions were imposed on 
particular pieces of property.211 Given that taxes are undeniably 
coercive, the difference is not that taxes are less coercive than 
such monetary exactions. The difference is that while there is no 
constitutional autonomy right to be free of general taxes, there 
is, in the Court’s view, a constitutional autonomy right against 
selecting a particular person’s property for uncompensated tak-
ings.212 Thus, the coercive nature of the threatened monetary ex-
action affects the constitutional result only when that exaction 
is selectively imposed on a particular person and thus affects a 
constitutional autonomy right. 
d) Plea bargaining.  In a plea bargaining agreement, a 
prosecutor threatens to bring criminal charges unless the de-
fendant agrees to a certain sentence. The prosecutor thus offers 
a benefit (nonprosecution) in exchange for the defendant’s waiv-
er of constitutional rights. Some argue that plea bargains are 
coerced by the threat of imprisonment.213 But plea bargains are 
usually enforced. The reason is that, although the threat of 
prosecution may leave the defendant with no reasonable alter-
native to agreeing to the plea bargain, duress exists only if the 
threat is also improper, which the threat of prosecution ordinari-
ly is not. 
How can we determine which threats of prosecution are im-
proper? By determining whether the threats are contrived. If the 
prosecutor is threatening to bring the same charges she would 
have brought if no plea bargain were possible, then she is simply 
offering an uncontrived warning. This does not penalize the 
criminal for exercising his constitutional rights, because he 
would have faced the same charges even in the no-threat world. 
 
 211 Id at 2598–2602. 
 212 See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599 (distinguishing Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US 
498 (1998), because the monetary obligation there was imposed generally rather than on 
a particular piece of property). See also Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2608 (Kagan dissenting, 
joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) (acknowledging that Dolan v City of Tigard, 
512 US 374 (1994), and various state doctrines suggest a distinction between general 
legislative fees and fees that are selectively imposed on individual properties). 
 213 See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 
Cal L Rev 652, 695–703 (1981); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U 
Chi L Rev 3, 12–19 (1978). 
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In this case, offering a plea bargain can only make the defend-
ant better off, by giving him the option of agreeing to a sentence 
he finds less harmful than the expected harm from prosecution 
in the no-threat world. 
In contrast, suppose the prosecutor is overcharging—that is, 
threatening to bring charges she would not have brought in the 
no-threat world—in order to coerce a plea bargain. Then the 
prosecutor is making a contrived threat that does penalize the 
defendant for exercising his constitutional rights, because he 
would not have faced the same charges in the no-threat world. 
Accordingly, plea bargains produced by such contrived threats 
should be unenforceable. 
Because there is usually no observable non–plea bargain 
baseline, it is generally difficult to determine whether prosecu-
tors have overcharged in order to induce plea bargains. Howev-
er, sometimes there is relevant evidence on that baseline. For 
example, suppose that a prosecutor initially indicated an intent 
to bring only certain charges but then, after the defendant re-
fused to plead guilty, added more charges. The Supreme Court 
has indicated that such a clearly contrived threat likely violates 
due process.214 But when prosecutors indicate their intent to 
bring certain charges before the plea negotiations begin, the 
Court has found that there is insufficient evidence to show a 
contrived threat that violates due process.215 Still, if concrete ev-
idence did exist that the prosecutor’s initial charges were delib-
erately excessive in order to coerce plea bargains, that should 
suffice to show a due process violation.216 
 
 214 See Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 360–61 (1978):  
While the prosecutor did not actually obtain the recidivist indictment until af-
ter the plea conferences had ended, his intention to do so was clearly expressed 
at the outset of the plea negotiations. . . . This is not a situation, therefore, 
where the prosecutor without notice brought an additional and more serious 
charge after plea negotiations relating only to the original indictment had end-
ed with the defendant’s insistence on pleading not guilty. As a practical matter, 
in short, this case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes as 
a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop that charge 
as part of the plea bargain. 
(citation omitted). 
 215 See id. 
 216 Although Professor Albert W. Alschuler believes that whether a threat is coercive 
should be based on a normative rather than predictive baseline, see Albert W. Alschuler, 
Constraint and Confession, 74 Denver U L Rev 957, 967–69 (1997), he has recently ar-
gued that the sentences imposed at trial are systematically greater than those that 
would be imposed in a system without plea bargaining. See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler 
and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 Duquesne L Rev 673, 698–99, 
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3. Comparing other proposed tests. 
Illustrious scholars have advocated many other tests for deal-
ing with unconstitutional conditions. However, their tests all ei-
ther underinclusively allow some contrived threats or overinclu-
sively condemn some uncontrived warnings. Further, when 
their tests produce results that overlap with the conclusions of 
a contrived-threat test, my analysis contributes a consequentialist 
proof in favor of those conclusions that has heretofore been lacking. 
Kathleen Sullivan argues that courts should focus on the 
distributive effects of conditioned benefits.217 Such distributive 
effects may well show that the selective denial or grant of bene-
fits violates equal protection or the constitutional rights of third 
parties. But if so, then either the threatened denial of benefits or 
the agreements granting benefits are themselves unconstitu-
tional regardless of any coercion. Professor Cass Sunstein makes 
a similar argument, but he recognizes that it amounts to aban-
doning the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.218 Their analyses 
thus cannot explain the puzzle of why conditions are sometimes 
held unconstitutionally coercive even when the threatened deni-
al of benefits and the agreement to grant benefits are both law-
ful. Further, when both are lawful, their tests would immunize 
all conditioned benefits, which would incorrectly allow contrived 
threats that penalize the exercise of constitutional rights. 
Professor Philip Hamburger argues that all conditioned 
benefits should be unconstitutional whenever the condition 
waives a constitutional right.219 But his test cannot explain the 
 
702 (2013). However, he acknowledges that some scholars and justices have reached a 
contrary empirical conclusion on the latter point. Id at 687–91, 702. My Article does not 
purport to resolve this empirical debate, but if the Supreme Court were persuaded that 
Alschuler’s position is empirically correct, then my Article would indicate that plea bar-
gaining should, under the Supreme Court’s own precedent, be banned generally, rather 
than policed with the case-by-case standard that is now used. 
 217 Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1421 (cited in note 6). 
 218 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an 
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 BU L Rev 
593, 594–95, 608 (1990). Sunstein recommends abandoning the doctrine for two reasons. 
First, he rejects what he assumes are the only possible baselines to determine when con-
ditions are a penalty or subsidy: (a) what the government could do, (b) the common law, 
or (c) a historical status quo baseline. Id at 597–604. He is right to reject those tests, but 
he does not consider a predictive standard that asks what the government would do if it 
could not condition the benefit. Second, he notes that penalizing constitutional rights is 
not always unconstitutional. Id at 603. But when that is so, direct coercion is permissi-
ble, and thus a key premise for the doctrine is not met. 
 219 Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 
Va L Rev 479, 480–81 (2012). 
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puzzle of why courts often hold precisely the opposite. His test 
would also incorrectly condemn all uncontrived warnings, which 
would harm both the government and the persons with the con-
stitutional rights in question. 
Professor Richard Epstein argues that current constitutional 
law deviates from ideal constitutional law by weakly protecting 
contract and property rights and allowing government redistri-
bution of wealth.220 To move us closer to his ideal, he argues that 
conditioning benefits should be (a) unconstitutional when his 
ideal constitution would not allow denial of the benefit (like pre-
venting businesses from operating), but (b) constitutional when 
his ideal constitution would not allow providing the benefit (like 
providing food stamps).221 One obvious problem is that one might 
disagree with his ideal constitution. But the problem is deeper: 
his approach would actually move us further from his own ideal. 
When the threat is to deny one of his ideally required benefits, 
Epstein and I would both condemn contrived threats but he 
would also condemn uncontrived warnings, thus resulting in pre-
cisely the denials that he fears, as well as preventing government-
person bargains that would make them both better off. When 
the threat is to deny one of his ideally prohibited benefits, he 
and I would both allow uncontrived warnings but he would also 
allow contrived threats, thus allowing the government to use its 
ideally prohibited power to penalize the exercise of constitution-
al rights that Epstein himself deems ideal. 
Professor Mitchell Berman argues that threatening to deny 
benefits should be presumptively unconstitutional if the purpose 
of carrying out the threat would be to make it more costly to ex-
ercise a constitutional choice.222 Unfortunately, purpose is a 
murky test, especially because different legislators have differ-
ent purposes, and Berman stresses that his purpose test devi-
ates from a pure predictive test like mine.223 Nor does he define 
the grounds for rebutting his presumption. Whenever his test 
produces conclusions that deviate from a contrived-threat test, 
his test will either undesirably allow contrived threats or unde-
sirably prohibit uncontrived warnings. 
 
 220 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and 
the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988).  
 221 Id at 27–104.  
 222 Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 Georgetown L J 1, 7, 46 (2001). 
 223 Id at 46. 
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Professor Kenneth Simons would deviate from a predictive 
baseline when the government plausibly believes the condition 
is relevant to the legitimate purposes of the government pro-
gram.224 But such deviations would undesirably allow a con-
trived threat that penalizes the exercise of constitutional rights 
whenever the condition has some relevance but that relevance is 
not important enough to mean the benefit would be denied with-
out that condition. As Simons acknowledges, his conclusion con-
flicts with case law prohibiting the government from condition-
ing benefits on working during the Sabbath.225 He argues that, 
without his related-purpose exception, the government could not 
limit political campaigning by public employees.226 But while 
such limits do seem permissible, the reason is not that they are 
uncoercive, but rather that the constitutional interest of un-
distorted politics justifies compelling public employees not to 
campaign, making coercion irrelevant. 
Professor Seth Kreimer proposes a mix of historical, equali-
ty, and predictive baselines to judge whether threats to withhold 
benefits are unconstitutionally coercive.227 However, whenever 
his historical or equality baselines allow conditions that a pre-
dictive baseline would condemn, his test wrongly allows con-
trived threats that penalize the exercise of constitutional rights. 
Whenever his historical or normative baselines condemn condi-
tions that a predictive baseline would allow, his test wrongly 
condemns uncontrived warnings that would benefit both the 
government and persons with the constitutional right. 
True, Kreimer’s historical baseline is relevant to the correct 
test because the past government conferral of unconditioned 
benefits helps suggest that the government would have likely 
continued to confer the benefit if it could not add the condition. 
However, government policy does change over time, and the his-
torical baseline should be rejected whenever there is evidence 
that it does not accurately predict what the government would 
have done without the condition. Kreimer argues otherwise be-
cause persons rely on prior benefits.228 But when the historical test 
deviates from the predictive test, it will be when the historical test 
 
 224 Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 San 
Diego L Rev 289, 291–92, 318–20, 323 (1989). 
 225 Id at 323. 
 226 See id at 319–20. 
 227 Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293, 1359–78 (1984). 
 228 Id at 1362. 
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either (1) allows undesirable contrived threats to withhold a new 
benefit, for which reliance is irrelevant, or (2) condemns desira-
ble uncontrived warnings about the future denial of old benefits, 
in which case his test would produce a denial of old benefits that 
affirmatively harms reliance interests. 
Likewise, Kreimer’s equality baseline is relevant to the cor-
rect test because government conferral of a benefit on all the 
persons who accept the condition may suggest a purpose for do-
ing so that would likely extend to everyone if the government 
could not adopt the condition. However, to accurately judge 
whether the condition unlawfully coerces the threat recipient, 
this equality baseline should be rejected when it deviates from 
the predictive baseline. After all, when there is such a deviation, 
the equality baseline will either (1) allow contrived threats to 
withhold benefits that others do not get, which penalizes the 
constitutional autonomy right, or (2) condemn uncontrived 
warnings about the coming denial of benefits that others do get, 
in which case his test would produce a denial of benefits that 
harms everyone. 
III.  THREATS THAT INDUCE NEW PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
A contract is obviously unenforceable if the terms are in-
dependently illegal or if the contract was induced by threats of 
illegal conduct.229 But threats of otherwise-lawful action to in-
duce an otherwise-lawful new contract can also constitute du-
ress when the threat is improper and the victim has no reasona-
ble choice.230 This Part shows that such threats are and should 
be deemed “improper” only when they are contrived. 
A. Threats to Exercise Unrelated Rights 
Even if a party has every legal right to terminate a contract, 
a threat to do so “for some purpose unrelated to the contract, 
such as to induce the recipient to make an entirely separate con-
tract, is ordinarily improper.”231 Such facts indicate that the 
threatener had no reason not to continue performing the first 
contract and thus would have performed it if unable to com-
municate a threat designed to induce the separate contract. 
Such a threat is thus contrived. 
 
 229 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 176–78 (1981). 
 230 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 175–76 (1981).  
 231 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment e & illustrations 9, 11 (1981).  
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The same can be true when a party threatens not to enter 
one contract in order to induce another. In one case, a lessor said 
it would rent to the purchaser of a leaving tenant’s business, but 
the lessor then threatened not to do so unless the leaving tenant 
forked over 45 percent of his business-sale proceeds.232 This 
threat was held improper, which thus invalidated the new con-
tract to pay 45 percent of the business-sale proceeds.233 This fits 
the contrived-threat test because the lessor had clearly indicated 
it was happy to rent to the new tenant and threatened otherwise 
only to extort part of the business-sale proceeds. 
In short, if a party threatens to exercise unrelated rights to 
induce a new contract, such threats are improper when the 
threat is contrived—that is, when the party would not exercise 
the unrelated rights in that way but for the ability to communi-
cate the threat. Such contrived threats impose penalties that the 
victim would not have incurred in the no-threat world. Because 
the threat of such penalties can induce the victim to agree to 
terms on the new contract that are not in his interest, the threat 
eliminates the normal assurance that the new contract allocates 
resources to the highest-value user. Thus, such contracts are 
properly held unenforceable. 
If, instead, the threat were to exercise unrelated rights in a 
way that would be in the interests of the threatener even if no 
new contract could be induced, then the threat would be an un-
contrived warning. Because the unrelated rights would be exer-
cised in an adverse way in the no-threat world, the new contract 
must make the threat recipient better off because he prefers the 
new contract terms to having the unrelated rights exercised ad-
versely. Thus, in such cases, the new contracts are properly held 
enforceable. 
B. Threats Not to Enter into the Challenged New Contract 
1. Threats to withhold desired goods unless the market 
price is paid. 
The typical threat that induces a new contract is a threat 
to withhold goods unless the market price is paid. Some argue 
that all such threats are coercive because individuals have no 
 
 232 See Wolf, 154 A2d at 630, citing Hochman v Zigler’s Inc, 50 A2d 97, 100 (NJ 
Chanc 1946). 
 233 Wolf, 154 A2d at 630.  
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reasonable choice but to pay to get the goods that they need to 
live.234 However, if the seller could not sell to the individual at 
the market price, then the seller would withhold the good be-
cause it would prefer to sell to someone else for the market price. 
The threat to withhold the good is thus an uncontrived warning. 
If duress law made the contract unenforceable, this individual 
would thus not get the good that he needed. (Of course, if price 
regulations generally required a lower price, then some individ-
uals would get the good, but recall our premise is that the terms 
of the contract are not independently illegal.) This conclusion is 
true even if the seller is a monopolist, because then the market 
price is the monopoly price, and the seller would prefer to sell to 
someone else at the monopoly price rather than sell to any par-
ticular individual at a submonopoly price. Thus, refusals to sell 
for less than the market price are enforceable no matter how 
much the buyer needs the good.235 
Batsakis v Demotsis236 shows that this point holds even in 
extreme cases. In war-torn Greece in 1942, Demotsis borrowed 
500,000 drachmae (worth about $25) in exchange for a promise 
to later pay $2,000 after the war.237 The court held that this 
agreement was enforceable.238 Because the war-torn circum-
stances doubtless made Demotsis desperate for the money, crit-
ics have argued that her promise was extracted under duress.239 
But those same war-torn circumstances also likely made having 
cash highly valuable and lending money highly risky, and no ev-
idence was offered that the high rate charged differed from the 
going market price. Thus, if Batsakis did not believe the con-
tract would be enforceable, he likely would not have lent the 
money to Demotsis, which would have made her even worse off 
given her apparent desperate need for money. Because the 
threat to withhold the money unless promised $2,000 was thus 
an uncontrived warning, the contract was properly held enforce-
able. Moreover, assuming that the high market rate reflected 
the desperate need of persons in war-torn Greece for cash, we 
want such high rates to be enforceable in order to encourage 
 
 234 See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1446–47 (cited in note 6). 
 235 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment f, illustration 14 (1981); 
Standard Box Co v Mutual Biscuit Co, 103 P 938, 943–44 (Cal App 1909). 
 236 226 SW2d 673 (Tex Civ App 1949). 
 237 Id at 673–74. 
 238 Id at 675. 
 239 Fried, Contract as Promise at 109–11 (cited in note 99). 
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others to increase the supply of cash to war-torn Greece to meet 
that need. 
2. Threats to withhold desired goods when parties have 
been cut off from the market. 
Sometimes parties might be cut off from the market, so that 
the market does not provide an effective constraint. If the buyer 
has been cut off, a seller might threaten not to sell a product un-
less the seller receives an above-market price. If the seller has 
been cut off, the buyer might threaten not to buy unless the 
buyer receives a below-market price. When should such threats 
be deemed contrived? 
First, consider cases in which a seller has taken steps to cut 
the buyer off from the market in order to try to charge the buyer 
an above-market price. Then a threat not to sell at less than an 
above-market price is clearly contrived because, if that threat 
could not be made, then the seller would be willing to sell to the 
buyer at the market price and would not have taken steps to cut 
off the buyer to begin with. For example, if a seller misleads a 
buyer into thinking that the seller will supply a good at the 
market price, and thus causes the buyer to forgo other options 
until it is too late, then a threat not to sell unless an above-
market price is paid is contrived and a contract at that above-
market price is unenforceable.240 
Now suppose that a seller, through no productive effort, 
stumbles upon a buyer who has been cut off from the market for 
adventitious reasons. For example, suppose that Bill Gates shows 
up at the emergency room needing immediate lifesaving treat-
ment, and the doctor says she will not treat him unless he prom-
ises to pay her $1 billion. In this case, the doctor’s threat is con-
trived because if that threat were not possible, the doctor would 
be willing to treat Bill Gates at the doctor’s usual market rate. 
Thus, Bill Gates’s agreement to pay $1 billion is unenforceable.241 
If, in the adventitious case, there is no clear market rate, an 
alternative price baseline might still show that the seller made a 
contrived threat. This point is illustrated by Post v Jones.242 In 
 
 240 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(b) & comment f, illustration 
13 (1981). 
 241 See Steven Shavell, Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J Legal Stud 
325, 338 (2007) (noting that courts hold adventitious holdup contracts to be unenforceable 
when they are substantially above market prices). 
 242 60 US (19 How) 150 (1856). 
  
2016] Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings 579 
 
1849, three whaling ships happened to find another whaling 
ship stranded on rocks in the Arctic right before winter and 
agreed to buy the stranded ship’s whale oil for a very low 
price.243 Although the whale oil was nominally “auctioned,” the 
stranded ship had more oil than the three ships could take, so 
they had no need to compete with each other on price.244 The Su-
preme Court recognized that even when salvage is an “absolute 
necessity,” parties can set salvage prices by contract when the 
stranded ship has access to “a market and competition.”245 How-
ever, the Court held that this contract was unenforceable for two 
reasons. First, the stranded ship had no reasonable choice but to 
take whatever the three ships offered, because “there was no mar-
ket . . . [and] no competition.”246 Second, taking the whale oil at the 
default price (which is set by salvage law when no binding con-
tract exists) was still highly profitable because salvaging the oil 
required little risk or effort and the opportunity costs of filling the 
cargo space were low given that the whaling season was ending.247 
The second finding in Post meant that the three ships’ 
threat not to take the oil at the default rate was a contrived 
threat because, if they could not make that threat, they would 
have happily salvaged the oil at the still highly profitable de-
fault rate. No salvaging was the wrong but-for baseline because 
salvaging would have occurred in the no-threat world. Indeed, the 
Court explicitly rejected the three ships’ claim that the stranded 
ship was not harmed because it was better off than if no salvaging 
had been provided.248 The effects of allowing salvagers to price be-
low the default salvage price in such accidental-monopoly cases is 
harmful because if ships know that rescues will cost them al-
most all the value of their cargo, then they will take excessive 
precautions to avoid the need for rescue.249 In contrast, because 
the default price was high enough to make salvage profitable, 
and because finding the stranded ship was adventitious, using 
the default price as the baseline for judging whether the threat 
was contrived will not reduce any salvage effort. But this result 
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depends critically on having some known, desirable price base-
line to determine whether a contrived threat had been made. 
Now suppose a seller earns being in a position to sell to a 
buyer who is cut off from the market. For example, suppose that 
the rescue ships were actually in the business of searching the 
seas for stranded ships. If the default price provided by salvage 
law suffices to compensate those search costs, then a threat to 
withhold salvage unless paid more than that default price would 
be contrived because, absent an ability to make that threat, the 
rescue ships would have incurred the search costs and provided 
salvage. If the default price provided by salvage law does not 
suffice to compensate for those search costs, then a threat to 
withhold salvage unless paid more than that default price would 
be an uncontrived warning because, absent an ability to make 
that threat, the rescue ships would not have incurred the search 
costs and thus would not have been there to provide salvage. 
This result could also be achieved by adjusting the default price 
to compensate for efficient search costs.250 
3. Bilateral negotiation to split extramarket surplus. 
Suppose that neither party has been cut off from the market 
but the seller’s goods are worth more to the buyer than to any oth-
er buyer. This is a frequent situation, often because of relationship-
specific investments. An employee who works at a firm may de-
velop firm-specific skills that make the employee more valuable 
to the firm than to any other firm. Or a business that rents a lo-
cation may find at the time of renewal that the location is more 
valuable to it than any other location is. In these cases, we have 
a bilateral negotiation over how to split an extramarket surplus 
because, although the buyer cannot find any other seller whose 
goods it values as much, the seller also cannot find any other 
buyer who values its goods as much. There will be a bargaining 
range, with the minimum price the seller would take being the 
market price other buyers would pay, and the maximum price 
the buyer would pay being the higher value it puts on the goods. 
The results of such bargaining are indeterminate. 
In these cases of bilateral negotiations about the split of 
extramarket surplus, the contrived-threat test is not helpful, be-
cause we have no baseline price to assess whether a contrived 
threat has been made. One might think that a contract at any 
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price above the seller’s reservation price must reflect a contrived 
threat because the seller would take the reservation price if it 
were unable to insist on a higher price. However, it is also the 
case that any price below the buyer’s reservation price must re-
flect a contrived threat by the buyer because the buyer would 
take its reservation price if it were unable to insist on a lower 
price. Such negotiations thus cannot help but reflect contrived 
threats by both sides, and a contrived-threat test thus cannot 
give either side a unique right to void the contract. Moreover, 
both sides would be worse off if contracts between them were 
unenforceable, because any contract between them leaves them 
better off than a contract with others. Thus, contracts produced 
by such bargaining are enforceable.251 
C. Blackmail 
In the case of blackmail, the threat is to divulge information 
to third parties unless the victim agrees to pay money. Black-
mail law had long been regarded as “one of the most elusive in-
tellectual puzzles in all of law.”252 Contrived-threat analysis 
helps solve that puzzle by showing that all blackmail contracts 
are necessarily produced by either contrived threats or uncon-
trived warnings and that each has distinctive harmful effects. 
Contrived blackmail threats are coercive and cause inefficiency 
between the contracting parties, without affecting the infor-
mation revealed to third parties. Uncontrived blackmail threats 
are uncoercive and benefit the contracting parties, but they pre-
vent information disclosures to third parties whose interests of-
ten trump the interests of the contracting parties. To explain 
blackmail law, we need to understand the combination of these 
effects. 
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1. Contrived blackmail threats are always coercive and 
invalid. 
First, consider cases in which divulging the relevant infor-
mation “would not significantly benefit the party making the 
threat.”253 Given that the act of revealing this information would 
not significantly benefit the threatener, it is likely a contrived 
threat. True, if divulging information is very cheap, one might 
wonder whether the threatener would divulge the information in 
the no-threat world for even insignificant benefits. But effort is 
necessary to collect information and (even when acquired fortui-
tously) to document the information in a way that can be di-
vulged such that it is sufficiently persuasive to be effective and 
to overcome the risk of suits for libel or slander. A blackmailer 
would not likely incur the costs of such effort for insignificant 
benefits without the prospect of making blackmail threats. 
Thus, any threat to divulge information is likely to be a con-
trived threat if divulging the information confers no significant 
benefit to the threatener. Allowing such contrived blackmail 
threats would harm the victim because in the no-threat world he 
would not pay money and the information would still not be di-
vulged. Because such contrived threats do not affect the revela-
tion of information, preventing such blackmail would not affect 
third parties. Finally, preventing such contrived blackmail 
threats would reduce blackmailer efforts that would inefficiently 
incur costs to induce nothing but an unproductive transfer of 
wealth. Because these effects are always negative, contract law 
correctly condemns all blackmail contracts that are induced by 
such contrived threats, regardless of what sort of information is 
at issue.254 
2. Uncontrived blackmail threats benefit contracting 
parties but harm third-party interests. 
Now consider cases in which divulging information would 
significantly benefit the threatener. For example, suppose the in-
formation were collected by an investigative reporter who would, 
in the no-threat world, publish the information in an article. In 
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that case, the threat to divulge the information is clearly an un-
contrived warning.255 Accordingly, an agreement to suppress the 
information is in the interests of both contracting parties, be-
cause the victim prefers paying the money to having the infor-
mation divulged and the blackmailer prefers getting the money 
to revealing the information. But this blackmail contract does 
prevent a disclosure of information to third parties that other-
wise would have occurred. Whether to invalidate blackmail con-
tracts induced by uncontrived warnings thus turns on whether 
third-party interests in the information trump the interests of the 
contracting parties, which varies with the information at issue. 
In particular, when the information concerns crimes, the 
public obviously has a powerful interest in knowing the infor-
mation because that helps deter crimes that harm the public. 
Because the public interest in discovering crimes exceeds the in-
terests of the contracting parties in concealing crimes, such 
blackmail contracts are invalid even when uncoercive. Accord-
ingly, contract law correctly condemns all blackmail about 
crimes, whether or not divulging the information would confer a 
significant benefit that would make the threat uncontrived.256 
The reason is that all such blackmail about crimes necessarily 
involves either (1) a contrived threat that creates inefficiency for 
the contracting parties without affecting information disclosure 
or (2) an uncontrived warning that suppresses the disclosure of 
criminal information to third parties whose interests trump the 
interests of the contracting parties. 
When the information involves embarrassing noncriminal 
information, third-party interests are weaker, and it is less clear 
whether they outweigh the interests of the contracting parties. 
In the investigative-reporter example, one might worry about 
the harm to the reporter’s newspaper or its readership from 
suppressing the information. On the other hand, one might re-
gard third parties’ interests in salacious information as weak. 
Such judgments vary by jurisdiction and court, as well as with 
the specific information at issue. General contract law thus does 
not condemn agreements that are induced by threats to divulge 
embarrassing noncriminal information when divulging would 
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significantly benefit the threatener (in other words, when it is 
an uncontrived warning),257 leaving it to other bodies of law to 
decide when such uncoercive contracts should be void on public 
policy grounds. 
Why, however, do some criminal blackmail statutes seem to 
overinclusively condemn even uncontrived warnings about in-
formation with little legitimate third-party interest? Perhaps 
partly because adjudicative errors in distinguishing between 
contrived and uncontrived blackmail threats would create strong 
underdeterrence concerns if such an exception were recognized. 
Nor are blackmail statutes literally applied in certain cases. 
Consider the fact that litigation usually ends in a settlement in 
which someone receives money and agrees not to disclose infor-
mation about the other party. Because such confidentiality has 
value, it must have been paid for in the settlement, so this ex-
change literally fits broad definitions of blackmail. But no one 
treats it that way. The analysis here explains why. Litigation 
already provides copious incentives to collect and document the 
information, so disclosure would likely be nearly costless. Fur-
ther, litigants generally dislike each other, so disclosure would 
likely produce serious psychic benefits. Thus, threats to divulge 
the information collected in litigation are particularly likely to 
be uncontrived. Adjudicative errors and underdeterrence are 
thus less of a concern, and an implicit exception to blackmail 
law is recognized. The analysis here thus helps explain not only 
why blackmail prohibitions are so broad, but also why nonliteral 
exceptions are sometimes recognized. 
3. Prior literature. 
Prior works on blackmail have tended to find it perplexing 
because they focus either on the legality of the threatened act 
rather than on the practical effects of the threats258 or on some of 
those practical effects to the exclusion of others. Some articles 
focus on protecting the interests of third parties in infor-
mation,259 but they cannot explain the universal ban on contrived 
blackmail threats, which do not affect third-party information. 
Other works focus on the harm to victims and the inefficiency of 
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efforts to collect information with no productive gain,260 but they 
cannot explain the ban on many uncontrived blackmail warnings, 
through which the victim benefits, the information would be col-
lected anyway, and the blackmail contract does alter the infor-
mation revealed to third parties. Professor Scott Altman has of-
fered what he calls a “patchwork” theory that combines many of 
these effects.261 What contrived-threat analysis clarifies is the 
deeper structure: that all blackmail must have one or the other 
of these sets of effects and that only the combination can explain 
the full scope and limits of blackmail law. 
CONCLUSION 
Contractual duress, unconstitutional conditions, and black-
mail have been long-standing puzzles because the focus has 
been on the wrong baseline: what the threatener should do or 
legally could do. To resolve these puzzles, one must instead focus 
on what the threatener would do absent the threat. Only con-
trived threats to take action that differs from this but-for action 
can harm the threat recipient and be coercive. Uncontrived 
warnings can only benefit the agreeing parties and thus should 
be unlawful only when even an uncoerced agreement would be 
unlawful, usually because the agreement harms third parties. A 
contrived-threat test not only explains the actual pattern of case 
law in a clearer fashion, but also provides a sound normative 
justification for those results. 
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